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• IMM v Department of Housing and Public Works [2020] QCATA 73
  This case concerned a residential tenancy dispute filed by the respondent in the local Magistrates Court in May 2020. Orders were sought pursuant to section 201 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (Qld) to enable the lessor to enter the property: at [3]. The respondent filed an affidavit of an employee of the respondent who ‘deposed, amongst other things, as to the applicant’s refusal to allow the respondent’s agents to enter the premises to effect repairs and carry out maintenance under the rules of entry’: at [5]. In response, the applicant filed an affidavit denying the respondent’s allegations: at [6]. In the first instance, the Magistrate (sitting as QCAT) ordered that ‘the rules of entry in respect of the tenancy of the premises be changed in terms which permitted entry of the premises for effective repairs to and maintenance of the premises’ including mowing the grass, replacing gutters, repairing the fence and replacing the vinyl flooring: at [7]. The applicant sought leave to appeal, or appeal, a previous decision (‘the first application’) and an application to stay a decision (‘the second application’): at [8]. The first application included allegations by the applicant that the respondent ‘misled the QCAT member’ and for ‘defamation and perjury’: at [9]. The second application included allegations of ‘prior breaches of the tenancy agreement by the respondent, including failure to maintain the yard resulting in attraction of snakes, affecting the applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder and leading to assaults upon the applicant by neighbours’: at [10]. In the applicant’s initial affidavit, he sought an order that his name be ‘suppressed “on the basis of mental health protection”’: at [19]. To determine this, section 66 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) was examined by Allen J, whereby his Honour asserted that the ‘exercise of discretion’ pursuant to this section ‘must be in the context of the paramount principles favouring open justice’: at [23]. Section 31(3) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which states that all judgments and decisions made by a court or tribunal in a proceeding must be publicly available, was mentioned in support of section 66. His Honour ruled that a non-publication order was ‘necessary to avoid endangering the physical or mental health or safety of the applicant’ and made additional orders prohibiting the publication of documents, evidence presented, and orders or reasons given by the Tribunal ‘to the extent that it could identify or lead to the identification of the applicant’: at [24].
• In an application about matters concerning LDR [2022] QCAT 274
  This matter concerned an application filed by a hospital social worker for an interim appointment of a guardian and an administrator in respect of an elderly woman. The applicant did not refer to human rights. The Tribunal noted that the decision to appoint an interim substitute decision-maker limits an adult’s human rights depending on the area of appointment, such as freedom of movement (s 19), property rights (s 24), freedom of association (s 22(2)) and freedom to deal with one’s property. However, the Tribunal did not engage in any further substantive discussion and was satisfied that the limitation was demonstrably justified according to the factors set out in s 13(2) Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Interim administrator was appointed.
• SL [2022] QCAT 233
  TO EDIT This matter concerned an application about a declaration of capacity seeking the removal the Public Trustee of Queensland as the administrator of SL, and the appointment of her sister DR as administrator. The tribunal found that any limits to SL's human rights were reasonable and justifiable. The tribunal found that the limit to SL's property rights (under s 24), were done so in the least restrictive way as they do not remove her ownership to her property and she is not deprived of or loses the benefit of those assets to meet her own needs. Otherwise the tribunal found that SL would give away funds and make financial decisions she would not understand. The tribunal also found that the tribunal is a 'public entity', as defined in s 9 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), acting in an administrative capacity.
• Ingram v State of Queensland (Department of Housing and Public Works) [2021] QIRC 011
  There was no substantial discussion of human rights in this matter.
• Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland & Anor (No 1) [2020] QSC 273; Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland & Anor (No 2) [2020] QSC 293; Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland & Anor (No 3) [2020] QSC 320
  Mark Jamieson, the sitting Mayor of the Sunshine Coast Regional Council (‘SCRC’), successfully campaigned for re-election as mayor during the Queensland Local Government Elections on 28 March 2020. The self-represented applicant, Mr Innes, applied to the Court of Disputed Returns for orders which would ‘have the effect of quashing the SCRC election result and ordering a new election’: at [2]. Mr Innes argued that the Electoral Commission of Queensland conducted the election unfairly and undemocratically in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, Mr Innes claimed that there were insufficient postal votes, a lack of clarity around the dates of execution of postal votes, and insufficient capacity for handling telephone voting. He also claimed that there was interference in the election by the Chief Health Officer and by way of SCRC announcements during the election period. As a result, he claimed that the election outcome was ‘significantly distorted:’ at [32]. Mr Innes also argued that his (and voters’) human right ‘NOT to be exposed to “risk of harm”’ was violated by the Electoral Commission of Queensland’s failure to prohibit physical polling: at [33]. However, no such right exists under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), and the Court noted that Mr Innes did not intentionally raise issues under the Act. Indeed, Mr Innes submitted that ‘it would be “a bridge altogether too far” to suggest that he was alleging a breach of any other human right:’ at [205]. Nonetheless, the Attorney-General gave notice that she would intervene in the application under section 50 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in response to the potential human rights issues involved. The Attorney-General submitted that ‘Mr Innes’ originating application and outline of argument, taken at their highest, place in issue the right to life (s 16 of the HR Act); and the right to take part in public life (s 23 of the HR Act)’: at [206]. The Court agreed that Mr Innes’ arguments alleged a breach of the right to take part in public life as per section 23 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Court also identified that certain arguments alleged a breach of the right to recognition and equality before the law pursuant to section 15 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). However, it was held that Mr Innes’ arguments did not allege a breach of the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life. It should be noted that the court did not consider this an appropriate vehicle for reaching solid conclusions about the operation of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in Queensland: at [202]. In its subsequent decision regarding costs (Innes v Electoral Commission or Queensland & Anor (No. 3) [2020] QSC 320) the court reiterated that:  ‘... because the applicant was in no position to assist in the interpretation of the Human Rights Act 2019, I did not consider it appropriate to make any definitive statements about the application of the Act in Queensland. In that sense, there was little public interest benefit in my consideration of the interpretation of the Act’: at [33]. The Court went on to consider the ways in which the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) may be engaged before the Court of Disputed Returns, namely: 1. under s 5(2)(a), to the extent that the Court of Disputed Returns has functions under Part 2 and Part 3 of Division 3 of the Act; 2. under s 48, to the extent that the Court of Disputed Returns is required to interpret relevant statutory provisions; and 3. under ss 58 and 59, to the extent that Mr Innes has an existing right to claim for a remedy outside of any unlawfulness arising under the HR Act: [211]. The Court found that it was only necessary to consider ss 58 and 59 in this case. Section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) provides that it is unlawful for a public entity to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights, or fail to give proper consideration to a right relevant to the decision. A person who claims that a public entity has breached s 58 can only bring legal proceedings on the basis of that claim by attaching it to a separate ground of unlawfulness (s 59(1)). The Court identified that several of Mr Innes’ allegations ‘identified acts or decisions of the ECQ which were arguably unlawful and engaged human rights:’ at [286]. However, the acts and decisions concerning conducting the election, including by in-person voting, were mandated by law. Further, although other acts or decisions ‘might’ have limited the human rights of some voters, any limitation on human rights was reasonable and justifiable according to s 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [301]. Thus, the Court concluded that the election was conducted compatibly with human  rights. Ultimately, Mr Innes had ‘not persuaded [the Court] that it would be just and equitable to make any of the orders he seeks’ nor that ‘there is any ground for believing that the SCRC election result does not represent the free and deliberate choice of electors:’ at [309]. His original application, as well as his application to re-open the hearing and application not to pay the Respondents’ costs, were dismissed.
• ISC v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2023] QCAT 304
  This case concerned an application for a review of a decision from the respondent to issue a negative blue card notice to the applicant. The respondent’s decision was made on the grounds that he was convicted in UK for the offence of negligent manslaughter and additionally on the grounds of alleged bullying whilst he was working as a sports coach. The Tribunal considered itself bound by s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as a public entity, and considered the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation, right to a fair hearing and his right to take part in public life. The Tribunal also recognised the competing human rights of the children under s 26(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) but did not engage in further discussions. The Tribunal affirmed the application by ISC on the grounds that the case was exceptional under Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) and it would not harm the interests of children and young people for ISC to have a working with children clearance. The Tribunal also made an order prohibiting the public of information that would enable ISC to be identified. The Tribunal considered this order necessary to prevent the identification of children who could otherwise be identified without such an order.
• Ishiyama v Former Chief Health Officer
  The case concerned a challenge to directions of the Chief Health Officer (CHO) under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) which came about because the applicants' requested reasons for the making of the decisions to make the relevant directions. The CHO refused to give reasons on the basis that his decision to make the directions was of a legislative character, not an administrative character, and that therefore he was not obliged to give reasons. The Court agreed with the CHO. There was no discussion of human rights.
• Isles v State of Queensland [2021] QCAT 135
  The applicant applied to the Tribunal claiming that the Queensland Police Service were directly discriminating against him by placing alerts, warnings and flags on his personal profile on their internal database. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was held not to apply as the events in question occurred prior to its commencement. The Tribunal noted that the evidence did not meet the standard required to make any findings of a contravention of human rights.
• JB v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney General [2023] QCAT 275
  This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the applicant, JB. The Tribunal affirmed the respondent’s decision. Although the Tribunal noted the importance of considering the right to the protection of children, it was satisfied that any limitations on JB’s human rights were justified in accordance with the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). There was no substantive discussion of human rights.
• JDT v PDL (No 2) [2022] QDC 147
  This decision concerned an interlocutory application regarding matters of civil procedure arising from defamation proceedings that were yet to be determined. The applicant sought to have their name anonymised in the court’s published reasons. The court considered it was in the interests of justice to grant an anonymisation order regarding the interlocutory judgment due to the unresolved nature of the substantive defamation proceedings. However, the court acknowledged that this would require reconsideration at the final determination stage of the defamation proceedings. In making this decision, the court noted that sections 31(1) and 31(3) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) recognised public hearings and publicly available judgments as civil rights: at [18].
• JDW v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2023] QCAT 100
  The applicant was coaching children at a community-based sporting organisation when his blue card was cancelled based on new information affecting his criminal record. He had a criminal history relating to supply and possession of drugs. He sought a review of the negative notice. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s right to recognition and equality before the law (section 15), right to privacy and reputation (section 25), right to take part in public life (section 23), and the right to education (section 36) under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) may be limited by a negative notice. However, these limitations were reasonable and justifiable in order to promote the best interests of children. The negative notice was confirmed. There was no substantive discussion of human rights.
• Jelacic v State of Queensland (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) [2021] QIRC 384
  The case concerned an appeal of finding and disciplinary decisions concerning five allegations associated with an alleged failure to comply with a workplace directive to wear a facemask. The Commission set aside the finding decision and disciplinary decision given the serious deficiencies associated with the decision-making process without expressing an opinion regarding the directions or whether the appellant properly established that he fell within a recognised exemption. Human rights were raised in the appellant’s submissions, but the Commission did not substantively discuss human rights.
• JF [2020] QCAT 419
  This case concerned an application for an interim order that the Public Trustee be appointed for all financial matters for JF. Member Traves recognised that the Tribunal was a public entity acting in an administrative capacity within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and recognised the making of an interim order for guardianship was ‘a serious incursion on a person’s human rights’.
• Jin v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy) & Or [2023] QIRC 013
  This case involved an application to progress a complaint that was originally made to the Queensland Human Rights Commission, onto the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. The complaint regarded an allegation of discrimination on the basis of race, from a job advertisement process conducted by the Queensland Art Gallery. Considering s 136 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and s 67 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the delegate advised the complainant that the unlawful discrimination complained of did not indicate a contravention of the above Acts. Member Pidgeon IC held that the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Queensland Human Rights Commission to reject a complaint. Section 67 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was mentioned when discussing that a complaint must provide enough details to indicate an alleged breach of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
• Jin v State of Queensland (Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy) [2023] ICQ 10
  This case concerned an application for a review of a decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission by Yin Cheng Jin, where the Queensland Human Rights Commission rejected a complaint by Mr Jin under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was raised briefly when mentioning how in the previous decision the Human Rights Commissioner advised that neither the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) or Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were breached, causing the complaint to lapse. Otherwise, there was no substantive discussion of human rights.
• JL [2022] QCAT 408
  This matter concerns an application by JL’s daughter, CL, to be appointed JL’s sole guardian and administrator. JL had previously appointed her son, AL, under Victorian legislation, and then subsequently appointed CL under Queensland legislation to act as her guardian severally. The Tribunal found that CL had been validly appointed to be JL’s sole guardian. The Tribunal observed that statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way most compatible with human rights pursuant to s 48, and noted that guardianship and administration decisions limit adults’ right to recognition and equality under the law (s 15), right to freedom of thought (s 20), right to privacy and reputation (s 25), and right to liberty and security (s 29). The Tribunal held that such limitations on JL’s rights were justified in the circumstances pursuant to s 13 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), including because they would also result in improved independence and access to services. It also noted that where the adult's choice of attorney/guardian was willing and able to perform that duty, appointing a different person would not be reasonable and justifiable.
• Johnston v Carroll (APM, Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service) [2022] QSC 115
  The case concerned whether legal professional privilege had been waived for the purpose of a subpoena requiring production of legal advice that had been issued by the applicant. Evidence was given in cross examination that a legal advice had given sufficient comfort that the direction would be compatible with human rights. The Court considered that privilege had been waived. There was no substantive discussion of human rights.
• Johnston v Commissioner of Police; Witthahn v Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Director General of Queensland Health [2021] QSC 275
  Seven police officers sought review of the decision by the Commissioner to issue a Direction requiring all police officers and some frontline staff members to receive two COVID-19 vaccinations by certain dates and to provide evidence of having done so. Contemporaneously, twelve ambulance officers and one nurse brought an application on the same terms against the Chief Executive of Hospital and Health Services and Commissioner of Queensland Ambulance Services. Solicitors and counsel for the applicants in both applications were the same and the matters were heard together. This case concerned seven police officers, twelve ambulance officers and one nurse. They sought to challenge Health Directives mandating they receive COVID-19 vaccines. Preliminary issues before the court were threefold. First, there was a question as to whether the court itself had jurisdiction to hear the application, having regard to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). Secondly, even if the court did have jurisdiction, should they hear it having regard to ss 12 and 13 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (‘JRA’) and the fact there are similar proceedings in the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission. Third, there was a question of whether the applicants were “persons aggrieved” within the meaning of s 7 of the JRA. The court did not feel it could properly exercise jurisdiction in this case as it did not have enough evidence about the applicants’ cases. For this reason, it deferred the consideration of whether to exercise jurisdiction under ss 12 and 13 of the JRA until hearing the applications fully. The Attorney-General intervened pursuant to s 50 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [54]. The Human Rights Commission intervened pursuant to s 51 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [54]. Their application alleged that the Directions breached: s 15(1), that every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law; s 17(c), that a person must not be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent; s 20, freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief; and s 21, freedom of expression: at [55]. The court succinctly summarised the interveners' submissions. Firstly, whether the matters subject to these proceedings are heard in the Court or in the Industrial Relations Commission, ss 48 and 58 remain agitated: at [56]. Secondly, even if the Court does not have jurisdiction under Part 3 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), it would have jurisdiction to consider the ss 48 and 58 matters in dealing with the Part 5 Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) matters: at [56]. The court decided to hear the parties as to directions necessary to progress the remaining parts of the application to a final hearing: at [58].
• Johnston & Ors v Commissioner of Police (Qld) & Ors; Witthahn & Ors v Chief Executive of Hospital & Health Services & Director General of Queensland Health & Ors; Sutton & Ors v Commissioner of Police (Qld) & Ors; Baxter & Ors v Chief Health Officer & Ors
  This decision concerned an interlocutory application for a number of separate judicial review proceedings challenging COVID-19 vaccination directives to be heard on the same date. The court noted that one of its primary aims in managing the proceedings was to prevent a multiplicity of decisions that may give rise to different legal conclusions relevant to the provisions of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [4]. There was no specific discussion of the application of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) to the case.
• Johnston & Ors v Commissioner of Police (Qld) & Ors; Witthahn & Ors v Chief Executive of Hospital & Health Services & Director General of Queensland Health & Ors; Sutton & Ors v Commissioner of Police (Qld) & Ors; Baxter & Ors v Chief Health Officer & Ors
  The four proceedings (Johnston, Whitthahn, Sutton and Baxter) involve applicants challenging the directives of the Executive which require them to be vaccinated against COVID-19 before entering particular premises or attending particular workplaces. There was no substantive discussion of human rights.
• Jones v Commissioner of Police [2023] QDC 113
  This case concerned an appeal against a conviction and sentence imposed for the appellant’s failure to give way to a motor car vehicle or pedestrian at a stop sign. The appellant referred to their right to a fair hearing (section 31) and submitted that law relating to failing to give way is an arbitrary and invalid law. The court acknowledged that the appellant is entitled to the charge being decided by a competent and impartial court under s 31 and 32 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) but was satisfied that the trial was fair. The court did not engage in any substantive discussion. The appeal was dismissed.
• Jones v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 317
  This matter concerned an appeal for a review of a decision to refuse the appointment of the appellant to a higher classification position. The applicant did not refer to any specific rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), and the commission did not engage in any substantive discussion in respect to the appellant’s human rights.
• JR v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2020] QCAT 332
  This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the applicant, JR. In confirming the respondent’s decision to issue a negative notice, the Tribunal noted section 13(2)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), and held that any limitation on JR’s human rights were consistent with giving primary consideration to the interests of children. This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the applicant, JR, which was made on the basis that the applicant was an “exceptional case” where the issuing of a positive notice would not be in the best interests of children. JR applied for a blue card in order to continue with her current employment as a registered psychologist. A negative notice was issued on the basis of JR’s commission of the offences of stealing, driving under the influence and assaulting and obstructing police. Other relevant factors were that JR overdosed on prescription medication in 2012 rendering her unable to collect her children from school and in 2016 and 2017, she was the victim of acts of violence perpetrated by her current partner which exposed her children to domestic violence. As she had not been convicted of a ‘serious offence’ within the meaning of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), a positive notice needed to be issued to JR unless the Tribunal made a finding that this was an exceptional case where it was not in the best interests of children for a positive notice to be issued. The Tribunal confirmed the respondent’s decision to issue a negative notice, noting that this was ‘consistent with the proper purpose of promoting and protecting the human rights, interests and wellbeing of young people’: at [39]. The Tribunal noted section 13(2)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which states that the nature and purpose of the limitation is a relevant consideration when deciding whether the limitation is reasonable. This was relevant to the Tribunal’s finding that any ‘limitation on JR’s human rights is consistent with the paramount interests of children’: at [39].
• JZ v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCAT 183
  This case concerned an application to the Tribunal to review the respondent’s decision to cancel the applicant’s positive notice and issue her with a negative notice, following a change to the applicant’s police information. In reviewing the decision, the Tribunal had regard to the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation (s 25), right to take part in public life (s 23), right to further vocational education and training (s 36(2)), and cultural rights (ss 27 and 28) under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal also had regard to the competing right of every child to ‘the protection that is needed by the child, and is in the child’s best interests, because of being a child’ as provided for in s 26(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). After the applicant was issued a positive notice and blue card in June 2018, the respondent was notified of a change to the applicant’s police information and decided to cancel the positive notice. The change occurred in August 2019 when the applicant was charged with contravening a domestic violence police protection notice. The respondent based its decision largely on the applicant’s history of domestic violence over a ten-year period with three different partners, including physical violence, the use of weapons against her partners and making suicidal threats and threats to kill or maim others, including threatening to pour acid on the face of a female who was present at an ex-partner's home. The respondent said the domestic violence behaviour raised significant concerns as to the applicant’s ability to manage relationship conflict and stressors without resorting to violence: at [19]. In reviewing the decision, the Tribunal acknowledged that the human rights of children are engaged by the application and highlighted the right of children to ‘the protection that is needed by the child, and is in the child’s best interests’: at [18]. While the Tribunal acknowledged that the human rights of the applicant were relevant to the application, the Tribunal held that the paramount principle of the welfare and best interests of children must take priority where the applicant’s rights and the rights of children conflict: at [48]. The Tribunal confirmed the respondent’s decision to issue a negative notice. The applicant’s case was found to be an ‘exceptional case’ where it would not be in the best interests of children for the applicant to be issued with a blue card: at [49].
• KAN [2022] QCAT 168
  This matter concerned an application for the appointment of a guardian and administrator for KAN. KAN had acquired significant disabilities at birth due to hospital negligence and a $5,000,000 compromise settlement of his medical negligence claim had been held and managed by a court-appointed trustee while he was a minor. The Tribunal considered the profound nature of KAN’s disabilities warranted the appointment of the Office of the Public Guardian for personal matters regarding accommodation, contact, healthcare and the provision of services (including National Disability Insurance Scheme) and for the court-appointed trustee to continue as administrator for all financial matters to ensure his rights and freedoms were protected. In making the order, the Tribunal held there to be no less restrictive means available and noted that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was not otherwise canvassed at the hearing.