Items

• DAN v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 229
  The applicant sought a review of the decision to cancel her blue card due to being deemed an ‘exceptional case’ under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld): at [1]. The decision came from the Department of Justice and Attorney-General following the conviction of the applicant in the Magistrates Court for the offences of Forging and Uttering and Fraud: at [25]-[28]. The conviction arose from an incident where the applicant altered a prescription for Codalgin and Valium to obtain unauthorised repeats: at [26]. The Tribunal considered evidence such as the applicant’s history of mental health concerns, doctors reports, evidence of the applicant’s drug reliance, the reflection of the effects of their behaviour, her help-seeking behaviours, and statements from employers and family: at [194]-[269]. The applicant submitted that the decision was incompatible with her human rights under section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), and particularly that it violated her right to education under section 36: at [66]. However, the respondent submitted that since the application for review was filed prior to the commencement of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), it didn’t apply to these proceedings: at [193]. The Tribunal agreed with this position, citing section 108 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [295]. The Tribunal upheld the decision from the Department of Justice and Attorney-General that the applicant's case was exceptional and confirmed the cancellation of her blue card.
• Davidson v Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships [2022] QCAT 367
  The case concerned an application for review of a yellow card negative notice. The Department identified that the rights to protection from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (section 17) and freedom from work (section 18), so far as they related to vulnerable people, are already incorporated into the Disability Services Act 2006 (Qld), and the application of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) supports but does not extend the paramount consideration. While section 34 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) provides that a person must not be tried or punished more than once for an offence in relation to that which the person has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with law, and although the decision to exclude the applicant from holding a yellow card might seem like a second punishment for the same offence, it is merely an unfortunate consequence of applying the Disability Services Act 2006 (Qld) protective regime. In confirming the decision to issue a negative notice, the Tribunal acknowledged the deliberately high bar imposed by the Disability Services Act 2006 (Qld) and considered that whilst the decision may be correct at law, it was not necessarily a just decision having regard to the financial circumstances of the applicant and the fact that the issuing of a negative notice would effectively void her of the opportunity to work in an industry longing for greater support.
• Davies v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 090
• Dean-Braieoux v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2021] QIRC 209
  This case concerned an appeal against a written decision under section 175 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) which required the applicant to submit to a medical examination on the basis that she was absent from their duty and the chief executive reasonably suspected that her absence was caused by mental or physical illness or disability. The Commission’s decision was made on the papers as neither party had requested an oral hearing. The applicant had submitted that the decision was unfair and unreasonable as the respondent’s suspicion was not reasonably held due to, inter alia, arguments based on human rights. Pursuant to section 37 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), she argued that she had “a right of access to a health service that provides medical advice not to risk travel to prevent serious risks to the health, welfare and safety of her family:” at [43]. She additionally argued that, pursuant section 26 Human Rights Act 2019, 'the government' “should adopt special measures to protect children which means that the best interests of a child should be taken into account in all actions affecting the child and which will depend on the child's personal circumstances:” at [43]. She also submitted that, pursuant to sections 15 and 25 of the Human Rights Act 2019, the respondent's decision to issue an IME despite possessing knowledge of her location, international border shutdowns and the safety risks of international travel was so unreasonable that it appeared to be a ‘disguised attempt’ to access her medical records and harm her reputation: at [44]. The Commission determined that the applicant’s reference to sections 26 and 39 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were not relevant considerations as the medical examination she was required to undertake was by video link, and thus did not require her or her daughter to leave the United States of America even if there was a risk doing so due to the COVID-19 pandemic: at [71]. The Commission also determined that sections 15 and 25 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) had not been breached because, as the elements of section 174 of the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) had been met, her privacy had not been unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with and her reputation had not been unlawfully attacked: at [79]. The Commission concluded that the decision was fair and reasonable: at [11], [84].
• DEF v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCAT 127
  The Applicant had been issued a negative blue card notice on the basis that his circumstances amounted to an exceptional case where the issuing of a positive notice would not be in the best interests of children. The Applicant had a lengthy traffic history, but more relevantly was previously subject to two allegations of inappropriate touching made by an 18-year-old girl with an intellectual impairment and his own niece. These allegations were never the subject of a formal charge. The Tribunal affirmed the Respondent’s decision and found that there was not sufficient evidence to displace the possibility of future risk of harm, where an exceptional case existed in which it would not be in the best interests of children for a positive notice and blue card to be issued. Whilst the applicant had denied the allegations and shown remorse, he had acknowledged he may have ‘unintentionally’ made the complainants feel uncomfortable: at [30]. The Tribunal considered the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and was satisfied that any limitation on the Applicant’s human rights was justified in that it had the proper purpose of promoting and protecting the rights, interests and wellbeing of children and young people.
• Devon v Department of Seniors, Disability Services and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships [2022] QCAT 386
• Dhanapathy v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 356
  The case concerned a disciplinary reprimand in relation to an allegation that the appellant illegally parked on the Princess Alexandra Hospital campus. The appellant made submissions that the respondent had ‘defied’ the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in causing the appellant’s ‘sheer mental agony and torture.’ The Commission disagreed and instead found that it was reasonable for the decision-maker to impose the disciplinary action.
• Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General v MAP [2022] QCATA 34
  The Department of Justice and Attorney-General appealed the Tribunal’s decision ([2020] QCAT 527) on the basis that the Tribunal had applied the incorrect legal test, taken into account irrelevant considerations or failed to take into account relevant considerations, and had denied the Department the opportunity to make submissions on matters of law: at [7]. The Department submitted that the Tribunal applied the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) without giving the parties an opportunity to address the applicability of the legislation and relevant human rights: at [7]. The Tribunal acknowledged that the proceedings had commenced prior to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) so it was inapplicable: at [25]-[27]. The Tribunal also acknowledged that there was significant weight placed on the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in the first proceedings, despite it being inapplicable: at [28]-[30]. The Tribunal concluded that there was an error in the Tribunal's prior decision and allowed the appeal: at [48]. The Tribunal’s prior decision of 15 May 2020 was set aside and the matter was returned for reconsideration by a differently constituted Tribunal: at [49].
• DKM [2020] QCAT 441
  This case arose from an application, made by the director of the non-governmental organisation providing nursing care to DKM, for the Public Guardian to be appointed as guardian for DKM. DKM was 79 years of age and was living with and being cared for by her daughter, HDR. DKM also received in-home care from a non-governmental organisation. In this hearing, the Tribunal was required to consider an application for a confidentiality order concerning a photograph identified as ‘H15’. The photograph was part of evidence relevant to DKM’s health care considerations. DKM had not submitted H15 and the Tribunal did not know whether DKM had consented to the photograph being taken or filed with the Tribunal: at [16]. The Tribunal noted that section 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) required it to interpret statutory provisions in a manner compatible with human rights when making a confidentiality order: at [17]. The Tribunal considered that the right to privacy under section 25(a) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was relevant to this decision, ‘in so far as the adult’s right being arbitrarily interfered with’: at [18]. The Tribunal determined that H15 did not provide any additional information that would inform the Tribunal’s decision: at [18]. The Tribunal considered the public nature of Tribunal files and the ‘significant psychological distress’ it could cause DKM if active parties or members of the public accessed H15: at [19]. It was held that the sensitive nature of the photograph required a confidentiality order be made to avoid serious harm to DKM: at [20]. The Tribunal determined that DKM’s right to privacy had been ‘engaged but not limited by the making of the confidentiality order’: at [22].
• DKM [2020] QCAT 443
  DKM was 79 years of age, and was living with and being cared for by her daughter, DR. DKM also received in-home care from a non-governmental organisation. An application was made by the director of the non-governmental organisation providing nursing care to DKM, for the Public Guardian to be appointed as guardian for DKM. The Tribunal initiated applications for the appointment of an administrator and an order about an Enduring Power of Attorney. The Tribunal was not satisfied that DKM understood the ‘nature and effect of her financial and complex personal decisions’: at [19] and [20]. An Enduring Power of Attorney dated 20 June 2017, appointing DR as attorney for financial personal and health matters, was declared invalid as the witness did not ascertain DKM’s understanding of the nature and effect of the document: at [26]-[29]. The application for the appointment of a guardian was dismissed on the basis that DKM’s needs would be met by her family and her interests would be protected by the Statutory Health Attorney: at [41-42]. The Tribunal noted the family’s ‘deep Hindu faith’: at [37]. The Tribunal concluded that DKM’s accommodation and care arrangement were ‘culturally and religiously significant’ to DKM and her family, and that her current accommodation was ‘both stable and appropriate’: at [37]-[39]. In respect of the application for an administrator, the Tribunal found that DKM required assistance with respect to financial decisions to ensure her financial needs were met and her financial interests protected: at [45] and [46]. In deciding whether DR or the Public Trustee of Queensland was the appropriate administrator for DKM, the Tribunal stated that it ‘gave consideration’ to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [52]. The Tribunal recognised that pursuant to section 48 of the Act, it was required to ‘interpret statutory provisions to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose in a way that is compatible with human rights’: at [52]. The Tribunal considered that DR had knowledge of DKM’s ‘holistic circumstances’ and had ‘informally managed the adult’s income so that funds have been available for the adult’s requirements having regard to her accommodation, care, religious and cultural considerations’: at [49] The Tribunal appointed DR as administrator for DKM for all financial matters. In doing so, it considered that DKM’s property rights (section 24) and right to privacy and reputation (section 25) were engaged and limited by the appointment of an administrator, but that these limits were ‘reasonable and demonstrably justified in accordance with section 13’ of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [52].
• DL v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney General [2021] QCAT 61
  DL (‘the applicant’) was a 65 year old foster carer who applied to review a decision made by the Department of Justice and Attorney General (‘the respondent’). The applicant had been issued a working with children clearance (previously known as a positive notice) in 2018. Subsequently, previously undisclosed details of the applicant’s traffic record were provided to the respondent by the Queensland Police Service. During the ensuing reassessment, the respondent was also provided information from the Department of Children, Youth Justice, and Multicultural Affairs regarding concerns about the applicant’s treatment of children in her care. On 29 August 2019, DL was issued a negative notice: at [1]-[6]. The Tribunal considered the traffic offences to be of limited relevance to DL’s eligibility to hold a working with children clearance and blue card: at [56]. The Tribunal considered the information from the Department of Children, Youth Justice, and Multicultural Affairs regarding the applicant’s breach of foster care standards in detail, but weighed these reported incidents against the evidence from the Queensland Police Service that the allegations of harm were unfounded and that the applicant had undertaken training and enhanced her support network: at [87]. The Tribunal also considered supporting witness testimony, as well as extensive and comprehensive psychologist reports on the applicant: at [87]. The Tribunal was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant presented a low risk to children: at [101]-[102]. The Tribunal discussed the requirements of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), noting that the Tribunal was acting in an administrative capacity and was therefore required to act and make decisions in a manner compatible with human rights: at [37]-[39]. The rights of the applicant to privacy and reputation (section 25), to take part in public life (section 23), and the human right of every child to ‘the protection that is needed by the child, and is in the child’s best interests, because of being a child’ (section 26(2)) were also considered: at [110]. The Tribunal was satisfied that the decision would meet the proper purpose of promoting and protecting the rights, interests and wellbeing of children: at [111]. The Tribunal set aside the decision of the respondent and replaced it with the decision that there was no exceptional case: at [112].
• DLD [2020] QCAT 237
• DLM v WER & The Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 79
• DM v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCAT 199
• Doedens v State of Queensland (Queensland Ambulance Service) [2022] QIRC 263
  The Appellant submitted that, inter alia, his human rights had not been properly considered: at [16], [20]. Though none of the relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD) were explicitly referenced, sections 13, 20 and 21 were in issue. The Respondent’s submitted the Appellant’s human rights were considered throughout an exemption application process undertaken by the Appellant, and any limitations of the Appellant’s human rights were justified by the need protect public safety from the threat of COVID-19: at [17]. The Tribunal found that the original decision had considered and justifiably limited the Appellant’s human rights to ensure the readiness of the health system in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: at [33]-[35]. The appeal was dismissed.
• Domrow v State of Queensland (Queensland Treasury) [2022] QIRC 331
  The Appellant submitted that, inter alia, his human rights had not been properly considered in implementation of the COVID-19 vaccination requirements for Treasury employees (‘the Policy’): at [18]. Amongst other reasonings, the Appellant contended that he did not want to take the ‘emergency approved COVID-19 vaccination’ and risk a vaccine related injury due to his family responsibilities: at [20]. Section 7(O) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (QLD) prohibits discrimination on the basis of family responsibilities. Therefore, the Appellant submitted the Respondent was in breach of s 15(2) (every person has the right to enjoy the person’s human rights without discrimination) and 15(3) (every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD): at [20]. The Respondent submitted that its decision was fair and reasonable in the circumstance. Furthermore, the Respondent submitted the Appellant has not advised how he believes the Policy is not compatible with human rights: at [22]. The Commission held that potential impact on human rights had been considered in the application of the Policy: at [30]-[31]. Thus, the Respondent’s decision was reasonable: at [31].
• Donnelly v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 149
  This matter concerned an application for a review of a decision by the respondent to refuse an exemption from COVID-19 Vaccination requirements requested by the applicant. The applicant referred to their right to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (s 17), specifically s 17(c) regarding being subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [31]. The Commission held that refusing the applicant’s exemption did not compel them to be vaccinated, thus not breaching s 17 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), and that the respondent had reasonably considered the applicant’s human rights: at [31], [32]. Thus, the appeal was dismissed: at [40].
• Dowling v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2020] QCAT 340
  The applicant applied for a renewal of his positive notice and a blue card under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) so that he could undertake university placement and volunteering work. The applicant was previously issued a blue card in 2015 and 2018, but due to recent criminal activity, he was issued a negative notice on the ground that ‘it is an exceptional case in which it would not be in the best interests of children for a positive notice to be issued’: at [3]. The Tribunal considered the Human Rights Act 2019 in its assessment. First, it noted that by undertaking this review, it was ‘acting in an administrative capacity’ and was a ‘public entity’ for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Therefore, the Tribunal was required to interpret statutory provisions in a way that was with human rights (section 48) and conduct itself in accordance with section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal considered the applicant’s right to a fair hearing (section 31) and right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 34), balanced against the right to protection of children (section 26(2)). The Tribunal was satisfied that its decision was compatible with human rights and that any limitations on the rights were ‘reasonable and justifiable’ according to section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [69]. The applicant also claimed that the issuing of a negative notice infringed his right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (section 20); right to freedom of expression (section 21); right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association (section 22); and right to take part in public life (section 23). The Tribunal did not raise objections to the applicant’s human rights submissions and accepted that he had a right to express his opinions. It also stated that it ‘did not seek to interfere’ with his rights of freedom of expression, religion or peaceful assembly: at [68]. Rather, it held that its task was to consider ‘whether the applicant’s case is exceptional such that it would not be in the best interests of children for a positive notice to be issued’: at [68]. The tribunal ultimately found that the applicant’s case was not an ‘exceptional case’ where it would be in the best interests of children to not issue him a blue card: at [70]. As a result, the respondent’s decision was set aside and replaced with the Tribunal’s decision that the applicant’s case is not an exceptional one.
• DP [2021] QCAT 271
  The case concerned an application for an interim order for the appointment of the applicant as guardian and administrator for her mother, DP. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was mentioned in relation to the Tribunal being a public entity acting in an administrative capacity, and thus its obligation to make decisions in a way that is compatible with human rights. The applicant sought to apply to the Tribunal to be appointed guardian and administrator of her mother, DP; at [1]. She submitted to the Tribunal that she seeks this in order to make certain financial decisions for her mother as she is not able to make those decisions herself. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was mentioned in regard to the Tribunal acknowledging they are subject to its provisions when making a decision to appoint an administrator or guardian as it is a public entity acting in an administrative capacity; at [11]. The Tribunal also considered the effect the appointment of a guardian would have upon DP and their personal autonomy and saw a decision to refuse the appointment of an administrator and guardian would be compatible with DP’s human rights; at [13]. In making its decision, the Tribunal considered a medical report regarding DP’s advanced dementia, the current risk of harm to her health, welfare and property and potential financial abuse by DP; at [8] - [10]. The Tribunal refused the application, noting that there was no immediate risk of harm to DP, and no interim order was granted.
• Drage v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 173
  This case concerned an application by the respondent for orders that they be granted leave to be legally represented at the proceedings between the respondent and the applicant. The substantive proceedings concerned the applicant seeking reinstatement of his former position, where he had raised the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [22]. This was not considered by the Commission.
• DTH v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 107
  DTH brought an application for review of a decision by the Department to cancel her blue card and issue a negative notice, which prevented her from being able to work with children. The applicant had been convicted of several offences, none of which were serious or disqualifying offences under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld): at [14]-[16]. The applicant denied she had committed the offences, notwithstanding her convictions: at [55]. The applicant argued that she had developed a support network, consisting of her church and friends: at [49]. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not taking responsibility for her actions, and that the support network was not sufficient to mitigate future risk: at [61]. Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the respondent: at [71]. The Tribunal held that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) did not apply as the proceedings began before the commencement of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [13].
• Du Preez v Chelden [2020] ICQ 008
  This case concerns conduct occurring prior to the commencement of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). It was agreed by both parties that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) did not apply to the case pursuant to s 108, which confirms that the Act has no retrospective application, and so it was not considered in any depth. This case concerned an appeal by the Commissioner for Mine Safety and Health, Ms. Du Preez. The Commissioner sought orders to set aside the Industrial Magistrate’s decision in a 2018 case to acquit Mount Isa Mines Ltd (‘MIM’) and Chelden Pty Ltd on charges of breaching provisions of the Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 (Qld) and to find both defendants guilty on all charges: at [2]-[3]. Both parties agreed that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) did not apply due to section 108, whereby proceedings commenced before the commencement of the Act are not to be affected: at [24]. Regardless, MIM argued that the court should consider Australia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, especially Article 14(7) which is ‘identical in terms to s 34’ of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [25]. Martin J, however, deemed it ‘unnecessary’ to consider the impact of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in light of section 108: at [25]. The application for leave to appeal by the Commissioner was ultimately ruled ‘incompetent’ and struck out: at [44].
• Dunlop v Body Corporate For Port Douglas Queenslander CTS 886 [2021] QSC 85
  The case concerned a claim for losses alleged to flow from a body corporate’s termination of letting and caretaking agreements, made by the applicants against the body corporate, body corporate committee members and the solicitor consulted by the body corporate. One issue that the Court needed to determine was whether the matter was a complex dispute to be resolved pursuant to the particular remedies listed in section 229(2) of the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld). In the Court’s discussion of section 229(2), the Court considered that the relevant authorities indicate that the provision is more than a statutory bar to the remedy sought in the dispute and that its effect is to remove the court’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute: at [64]. The Court then considered that these authorities did not suggest that the provision was ambiguous or lacked clarity, or raise ‘an alternate realistically arguable interpretation of the effect of s 229 which ought now be favoured because of the subsequent creation of the requirement in s 48 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) that statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights’: at [68]. Overall, the Court considered that the conclusions ‘trend[ed] in favour of granting the application to set aside the claim and statement of claim in respect of the body corporate for the reason that it is a complex dispute’: at [70]. The Court ultimately 'refrain[ed] from reaching a concluded view on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the application pending the receipt of further submissions made in light of my orders and the matters canvassed in these reasons’: at [73].
• EB [2021] QCAT 434
  This matter concerned an application for an interim order seeking the appointment of the Office of the Public Guardian and the Public Trustee of Queensland. The Tribunal recognised that the right to freedom of movement (section 19) and right to privacy and reputation (section 25) under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) may be affected by the appointment of a guardian for accommodation matters. The Tribunal noted that these rights, in addition to the right to a fair hearing (section 31) under the Human Rights Act 2019, would be limited in the short-term pending a hearing held at a later date. This matter arose out of an application made by JT, a social worker at the local hospital, to have the Office of the Public Guardian and the Public Trustee of Queensland appointed as guardian and administrator, respectively, for EB. EB, an 87 year old woman diagnosed with severe dementia, lived in an aged care facility. She had previously appointed her son, RB, as her Enduring Power of Attorney for financial, personal and health matters: at [4]. RB sought to move EB from her current placement because the fees were unaffordable and he did not want to sell EB’s assets to pay for her care: at [9]. In support of the application, JT raised concerns about the level of care needed by EB and argued the interim orders were necessary to prevent EB’s family from removing her from the aged care facility which would be ‘physically painful’ to EB and ‘detrimental to her cognitive state’: at [6]. The Tribunal was satisfied that EB had impaired capacity for decisions around her health, lifestyle, accommodation and finances: at [15]. The imminence of the proposed move supported the granting of the interim appointment of the Office of the Public Guardian for accommodation matters: at [16]. The Tribunal accepted that it was subject to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as a ‘public entity’ when making interim orders and was required under section 48 to consider the human rights that may be affected by the Tribunal’s decision: at [18]. The Tribunal recognised that EB’s right to freedom of movement and right to privacy and reputation may be limited by the appointment of a guardian for accommodation matters. The Tribunal noted that EB’s right to a fair hearing had also been limited in the interim, pending the hearing of the substantive guardianship and administration applications at a later date: at [18]. The Tribunal recognised the appointment of a guardian on an interim basis was only authorised where the Tribunal was satisfied there was an immediate risk of harm to the adult’s welfare: at [20]. The urgent nature of the application and the purpose of protecting EP from the risk of harm justified ‘the limit on the adult’s right to a fair hearing on a short-term basis, and limits on rights of free movement and privacy until the matter is heard’: at [20]. The Tribunal considered the object of protecting EB from the risk of harm outweighed the limitation of her rights in circumstances where the full hearing of the guardianship and administration applications would occur in less than three months: at [20]. On this basis, the limitations were reasonable and justifiable: at [20]. The Tribunal granted an interim order for the appointment of the Office of the Public Guardian for accommodation decisions for three months and dismissed the interim application for the appointment of an administrator: at [2].
• ED v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 56
  ED (‘the applicant’) applied to review a decision made by the Department of Justice and Attorney General (‘the respondent’) to issue a negative blue card notice on the basis that the applicant’s circumstances amounted to an ‘exceptional case’ where the issuing of a positive notice would not be in the best interests of children: at [4]. ED had sought a blue card to continue child-related work he had previously undertaken inter-state under the equivalent of a blue card. The negative notice was issued because of ED’s prior offending behaviour, which included ten convictions relating to harassment and contraventions of domestic violence orders: at [2]. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was considered in reference to the Tribunal’s position as a ‘public entity’ when acting in an administrative capacity, and the corresponding obligations on the Tribunal to make a decision in a manner compatible with human rights, give proper consideration to human rights and consider whether the decision would be compatible with human rights: at [22]-[24]. The applicant argued that the decision affected his right to work, which was protected by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, although not expressed in the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [26]. The Tribunal considered that the applicant’s right to work was a relevant factor to take into account, but concluded that the interests of children were paramount and took priority when the best interests of children were in conflict with the applicant’s human rights: at [28]. While making it clear that the Tribunal did not condone the applicant’s behaviour following the end of his marriage, the respondent’s decision to issue a negative notice was set aside on the grounds that the applicant’s circumstances did not meet the threshold of an exceptional case so as to prevent the issue of a positive notice: at [50].