Items

• Burleigh Town Village Pty Ltd (3) [2022] QCAT 285
  The applicant applied for an exemption pursuant to section 113 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) for the purposes of owning and operating a manufactured home park supplying special accommodation solely for persons aged 50 and older. The Tribunal weighed the application against the infringement of rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and subsequently refused the application. The applicant sought an exemption from several provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) to own and operate a manufactured home park reserved exclusively for accommodating persons aged 50 and older, on the grounds this was a special purpose under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) because it provided benefits for the aged. The Tribunal confirmed it was acting in an administrative capacity in deciding the exemption application and, in that capacity, was considered a public entity for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (section 9(4)(b) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)). The Tribunal was therefore required to give proper consideration to, and make a decision in a way that was compatible with, human rights pursuant to section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal accepted that the application did affect the rights to equality and to equal protection of the law without and against discrimination set out in section 15 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal then considered whether the activity of owning and operating a manufactured home park supplying special accommodation solely for persons aged 50 and older was a special measure pursuant to section 15(5) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and therefore compatible with human rights, ultimately concluding this was not established in this case: at [102]-[112]. The Tribunal then applied the justification test in section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). After considering arguments including in relation to housing affordability, compatibility, security, like-mindedness and shared values, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the applicant had demonstrated that the age limitation was a legitimate and proportionate limitation on the right to equality and to equal protection of the law without and against discrimination: at [113]-[126]. The Tribunal was not persuaded that the exemption would limit the right to freedom of association under section 22(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as owners were free to associate with whomever they wish, both inside and outside the facility: at [129]. The Tribunal considered the extent to which the exemption would limit the property rights in section 24 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal accepted that those property rights included the right not to be exposed to substantial restrictions on a person’s ability to derive profits from their property, that granting the exemption would engage this right by limiting residents’ ability to freely dispose of their home to those aged below 50, and that this was not a legitimate and proportionate limitation pursuant to section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [144]-[157]. The application was refused.
• CA v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney General [2022] QCAT 305
  The case concerned an application for review of a negative blue card notice arising from a decision that the applicant’s case was an ‘exceptional case’ within the meaning of s 221(2) of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld). The applicant had been convicted of assault and domestic violence offences after she and her brother physically assaulted her ex-husband and his sister during an altercation on 7 March 2019. The applicant and her ex-husband were going through a separation and the offending occurred at their former matrimonial home with no children present: at [40], [48], [54]. When conducting a review of a child-related employment decision, the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) applies as the Tribunal is a ‘public entity’ under it: at [36] Accordingly, the Tribunal needed to interpret statutory provisions, to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose, in a way that is compatible with human rights: at [37]. Further, ‘except when a different action or decision is required because of a statutory provision or other law’, the Tribunal must ‘act or make a decision in a way that is compatible with human rights’; and, ‘in making a decision, give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision, at least by identifying human rights that may be affected by the decision and considering whether the decision would be compatible with human rights’: at [38]. A decision will be compatible with human rights if it does not limit a human right or if it limits a human right in a way which is reasonable and justifiable: at [39] Regarding the evidence given and matters considered, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant now presents a low risk of reoffending and that there is no real and appreciable risk that the applicant would harm children in the course of her employment or volunteer work: at [160]. The Tribunal was satisfied that it would not be in the best interests of children for the respondent to issue a working with children clearance to the applicant: at [161]. The Tribunal considered that, pursuant to section 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the Tribunal had interpreted s 221 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) consistently with its purpose, in a manner compatible with human rights, and made its decision with proper consideration of the relevant human rights and implications of the decision in terms of compatibility with human rights: at [168]. In considering the human rights that may be affected by this child-related employment decision under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), the Tribunal considered, with respect to the applicant, the human rights of the applicant to ‘privacy and reputation’, to ‘take part in public life’ and ‘to further vocational education and training’. As to children, the Tribunal considered the human right of every child to ‘the protection that is needed by the child’ and is in the child’s best interests, because of being a child’: at [169]. Ultimately, the Tribunal was satisfied that its decision would nevertheless be compatible with human rights because it is reasonable and justifiable having regard to the matters set out in s 13(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [170]. Indeed, it considered that the decision would, ‘have the proper purpose of promoting and protecting the rights, interests and wellbeing of children, which is itself a human right’ and that any limit on the applicant’s human rights would be consistent with the purpose of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) that prioritises the welfare and best interests of children as paramount considerations: at [170].
• CA v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2020] QCAT 452
  This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the applicant, CA. CA had an extensive criminal history, having been convicted of over 50 offences committed between 2002 to 2013. However, CA had never been convicted of a ‘serious offence’ within the meaning of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld). A positive notice therefore needed to be issued to CA, unless the Tribunal made a finding that this was an exceptional case where it was not in the best interests of children for a positive notice to be issued. The Tribunal noted that the ‘overarching objective of the [Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000] which the Tribunal must observe, is to ensure that the welfare and best interests of a child are paramount, and that every child is entitled to be cared for in a way that protects the child from harm and promotes the child’s wellbeing’: at [18]. It found that CA was not a threat to the welfare and best interests of children, and that protective factors such as his mental health care, lifestyle changes, and support network lowered his risk of re-offending: at [61]. As a result, the Tribunal set aside the respondent’s decision not to issue a blue card and replaced it with the Tribunal’s decision that there is no exceptional case: at [63]. In conducting its review, the Tribunal had regard to the applicant’s right to a fair hearing (section 31) and right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 34), as well as the right to protection of children (section 26(2)) under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [64]. There was no in-depth discussion of these rights. The Tribunal was satisfied that the decision was compatible with human rights and to the extent were there any limitations on those rights, they were reasonable and justifiable in accordance with section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [64].
• Campbell v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 405
  This matter concerned an appeal of the respondent’s decision to suspend the appellant from her duty without remuneration, following the appellant’s failure to comply with vaccination requirements. The appellant referred to her human rights however did not expand on this submission with specific reference to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The commissioner was satisfied that the decision-maker had thoroughly considered the appellant’s human rights, and appropriately concluded that any limitation was reasonable and justified.
• Carne v Crime and Corruption Commission [2021] QSC 228
  The applicant was the Public Trustee of Queensland. He is mentioned in a report prepared by the Crime and Corruption Commission (“CCC”) into alleged corrupt conduct by him. The CCC forwarded the report to the Parliamentary Crime and Corruption Committee (“PCCC”) to be given to the speaker of the Legislative Assembly. The report may then be published pursuant to the Crime and Corruption Act 2001. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was raised in communication by the Crime and Corruption Commission to Gilshenan & Luton, solicitors for the applicant. The CCC acknowledged their duty to act in accordance with the Act.
• Casson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 113
  The appellant sought a review of the decision to suspend his employment from public service without remuneration as a result of his noncompliance with a direction to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. In making the decision, the Commission considered the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) but held that the importance of community health and safety outweighed the limits on the appellant’s human rights: [9], [34], [35]. There was no discussion of the specific provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Commission held that the decision was fair and reasonable and thus the appeal was dismissed: at [36], [37].
• CDC v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 112
• Cement Australia (Exploration) Pty Ltd & Anor v East End Mine Action Group Inc & Anor (No 4) [2021] QLC 22
  The case concerned objections to an application for a mining lease and an amended environmental authority regarding the East End limestone mine near Gladstone operated by Cement Australia: at [1]. The Court referred to Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors [2020] QLC 33 (‘Waratah (No 1)’) to establish that the Land Court was a public entity that would act or make a decision in making recommendations on the applications within the meaning of section 58(1) and that, while no human rights-based objection had been made as the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) had not commenced when the relevant opportunity for lodging objections ended, there need be no mover for the Court to raise human rights issues: at [49] – [51]. The Court then set out, at [52]-[54]: The object of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) Section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which places an obligation on public entities when acting in an administrative capacity • The definition of the term ‘compatible with human rights;’ That section 8 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) acknowledges that human rights are not absolute and may be subject to limitation; and That any limitations on rights must have a clear legal basis and must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in the circumstances. The Land Court is required to consider the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and is subject to the obligations under section 58, as accepted by President Kingham in Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors (No 2) [2021] QLC 4 (‘Waratah (No 2)’) The obligations under section 58(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) are both substantive and procedural The substantive obligation under s 58(1)(a) makes it unlawful for a public entity to act or make a decision in a way that is incompatible with a human right The procedural obligation in section 58(1)(b) notes that it would be unlawful for a public entity in making a decision to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right; and President Kingham in Waratah (No 1) discusses the distinction between these obligations at length: at [53]-[54]. The Court, at [55]-[57], then provides that it would address the five steps of engagement in applying human rights obligations placed on public entities under section 58, which were identified by the Department of Environment and Science in Waratah (No 2) and adapted from the five-stage roadmap for assessing incompatibility under similar provisions of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). The five steps of engagement in applying human rights obligations involve a consideration of, at [55]: What rights might be engaged; What limitations might be alleged; How a limitation on rights might be justified, considering procedural and substantive legality, and proportionality; Whether the decision gave proper consideration to the rights engaged; and Whether the Court could not reasonably act differently or make a different decision because of a statutory provision or under law. The Court later discusses how, under section 24(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), a person must not be arbitrarily deprived of their property: at [382]. The protection against being deprived of property is “internally limited to arbitrary deprivation of property:” at [382]. In the absence of a definition of property, arbitrariness or deprivation in the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the Court refers to the definition of property in the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) and the interpretation of ‘arbitrary’ to mean both ‘illegality’ and ‘unjustly’ and concern capricious, unpredictable and unreasonable conduct that is not proportionate to the legitimate aim sought by the High Court: at [383] – [384]. The Court establishes that the ‘deprivation’ of property is not arbitrary when there is an appropriate relationship between the means and ends: at [385]. The Court then considered the three principles distilled from PJB v Melbourne Health and Another (Patrick’s Case) that, at [388]: deprivation of property encompasses economic interests and deprivation in a broad sense formal expropriation is not required and de facto expropriation of property is sufficient to breach the right; and the right to ownership and peaceful enjoyment of property are key features of the common law. The Court considered the objections and evidence raising a number of interests relating to the objector’s property which may be affected by the mine expansion and concluded that, at [390] - [393]: the additional ground water losses as a result of the mine expansion might affect private bores in the East End, with no evidence of current use of bores for irrigation; the modelling of flood impacts demonstrated no significant adverse effects on the adjoining properties and that velocities were such that scouring of grazing land soils and grasses not predicted to occur, and that, in relation to stream losses, the evidence that recirculation of mine dewatering delivers an immediate top up to the affected streams; and the loss of Mrs Derrington’s views as a result of the mine and construction of the bund/levy may affect the common law right to peaceful enjoyment of property. The Court considered that it needed to determine whether the limitation was in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and compatible with the rule of law: at [394]. The Court discussed that the process of justification would usually rest with the party asserting the right however in this matter, no party has raised human rights but, in the absence of objections, President Kingham in Waratah (No 2) said that the Court is required to consider a range of criteria identified by the governing legislation, regardless of whether they are raised in the objections; and that the procedure prescribed by law limiting these rights are demonstrably justified: at [395]. The Court then considered that the limitation on the human rights must be proportionate to other competing private and private and public interests: at [398]. The Court considered that it could be argued that reduced landholder access to groundwater and visual amenity was reasonably and demonstrably justified by the mitigation actions in the make good provisions and the public benefits regarding regional employment and community engagement and interactions, and through royalties which accrue to the State: at [400]. The Court discussed that the element of arbitrariness corresponds with section 269(4)(k) of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) that requires a consideration of whether the public right and interest will be prejudiced and that, upon consideration, it could be concluded that the public right and interest will not be prejudiced and that the proposed extension is proportionate to the public interest: at [401]. It was considered that the deprivation of property is not arbitrary because there is an appropriate relationship between the means of expanding the mine and the property rights which will be affected, and that there is a proportionate and appropriate relationship between the deprivation and the public interest served by the expansion: at [402]. The Court then considered that the fourth step in Waratah (No 2) states that even if the limits are lawful and proportionate, the decision must give proper consideration to the rights engaged: [403]. As the parties did not raise human rights in their objections, the Court considered the human rights in deciding what recommendation to make in the initial engagement step: at [404]. The Court then had to consider whether a statutory provision or law prescribes a different decision and considered that, while precluded from hearing the objector, the Court was not precluded from considering human rights generally in making recommendations, as discussed in Waratah (No 2): at [405]. The Court accepted that there will be property right impacts associated with the expansion of the East End mine but, considering the elements of the human right to property, determined that the deprivation of property was not arbitrary and was reasonable and demonstrably justifiable and, having considered the five steps in Waratah (No 2), concluded that the recommendation would not differ based on the consideration of the human right to property: at [406].
• Cervenjak v State of Queensland (Department of Children, Youth Justice & Multicultural Affairs) [2022] QIRC 363
• Chinniah v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 186
  This matter concerned an appeal of the respondent’s decision to refuse to convert the appellant’s employment from an AO5 Deployment Officer to an AO6 Senior Deployment Officer where she had been effectively acting at the higher level since August 2018. The Commission reproduced clause 4.3 of Directive 13/20 which referred to the obligation under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) to make decisions in a way that is compatible with human rights and to give proper consideration to human rights, but did not consider any particular sections of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Commission did not engage in any substantive discussion in respect of the appellant’s human rights.
• Chou v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 153
  This case concerned an appeal against a deemed decision not to convert the appellant to a higher classification position. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was referred to in a quoted passage from ‘Directive 13/20 Appointing a public service employee to a higher classification level’. However, there was no substantive discussion of human rights in the reasons.
• Clarke v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2022] QCAT 415
  This matter concerned an application for review of a decision by the Queensland Police Service to revoke the applicant’s weapons license. The Tribunal upheld the decision on the grounds that the applicant was no longer a fit and proper person to hold such a license. Although not expressly argued by the parties, the Tribunal stated it was necessary to consider how the decision to revoke the license would interfere with the applicant’s property rights under section 24 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD). The Tribunal found that the applicant’s property rights were justifiably limited with respect to owning weapons in the circumstances, and pursuant to section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD).
• Clarke v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 70
  The case concerned an appeal against a suspension without remuneration decision that involved the Appellant’s refusal to meet COVID-19 vaccination requirements. The Appellant contended that she was deprived of her human right not to be “subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without … full, free and informed consent” pursuant to section 17(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Respondent acknowledged that this right was considered when making its decision, however the limit was justifiable by the need to protect the health and safety of employees and the public. The Commission confirmed the decision of the Respondent and considered that the decision to suspend the Appellant without remuneration was fair and reasonable.
• Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 018
  On appeal to the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, the appellant sought a review of a decision by the Queensland Police Service to suspend her employment without remuneration after she refused to comply with Direction No. 12 that mandated the COVID-19 vaccination for the health and safety of members of the Queensland Police Service. Though the appellant alleged that the respondent had acted in bad faith and against her human rights in such circumstances, the Acting Assistant Commissioner for the respondent submitted that the limits on human rights were reasonable and justified by the need to ensure compliance with the direction. The Tribunal found that the respondent’s decision was fair and reasonable, and the limitation on the appellant’s human rights was justified pursuant to section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (QLD).
• Colebourne v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 40
  The case concerned an appeal against a failed application for an exemption pertaining to mandatory COVID-19 vaccination and mask requirements for police officers. The appellant contended that the decision did not have sufficient regard to her rights, and that given her work involved limited contact with others, there were ‘other ways to achieve the purpose’ than the limits on her human rights, such as a transition to fully remote work: at [87]. The Commission noted the potential application of s 17 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which provides that a person ‘must not be subject to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent’: at [95]. However, the Commission considered that it was not unreasonable to refuse the exemption request after taking into account human rights, and no evidence that the respondent failed to do so: at [96]. The Commission did not provide any substantive discussion of human rights.
• Collins v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 215
  The appellant had previously requested an exemption from compliance with the Directive on account of a genuinely held religious belief, which was refused. On internal review of the decision, the respondent had acknowledged that the decision impinged upon the appellant’s right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief, and her right to freedom of expression under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The respondent determined that such an impingement was justified when weighed against the competing interests of workplace and community safety. In dismissing the appeal, and having regard to the respondent’s explanation as to how the appellant’s human rights were considered, Member Knight IC rejected the appellant’s human rights argument as a ground of appeal: at [58]-[61].
• Commissioner of Police v Keating-Jones [2022] QDC 56
  The matter involved a Section 222 Justices Act appeal. The respondent had been charged with dangerously operating a motor vehicle while adversely affected by an intoxicating substance and a permanent stay had been granted by the Magistrates Court to avoid abuse of justice that would occur if a further period of mandatory disqualification was imposed for the failure to supply a specimen of breath charge. This order was set aside by the District Court. In the circumstances of this case, the conduct of failing to supply a specimen was found to be separate conduct. The human right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 34) was considered to be referable to the common law “double jeopardy” principle and was identified as relevant, but not substantively discussed.
• Coonan v Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2020] QCAT 434
  The Tribunal conducted a review of the decision made by the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages to list the applicant as the child’s ‘mother’ rather than the child’s ‘father’. The applicant was born female but identified as a man and in October 2012 amended his birth certificate and Australian passport to reflect his male gender and name. He retained the physical capacity to conceive and gave birth on 12 February 2019 and on 18 March 2019, using the approved form to register the birth of his child, listed himself as the father and provided that he was a transgender man, who gave birth to the child conceived via IVF: at [19]. Further documentation was provided in support of his successful reassignment of gender upon request by the Registry. The Registrar notified the applicant on 11 April 2019 that as he was the person who gave birth, he was recorded as the mother on the birth registration: at [21]. The Tribunal confirmed this interpretation of ‘mother’: at [59], [61] and [64]. The applicant submitted that the relevant human rights under Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were the right to equal protection of the law without discrimination, the right not to have privacy or family unlawfully interfered with and the right to protection of family: at [10]. However, as the legal proceedings commenced in June 2019, prior to the commencement of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was held not to apply in this case: at [75]. The Tribunal held that the rights of children should still be taken into account and discussed the balance between the rights of parents who have undergone sexual reassignment and the rights of the child. The Tribunal considered a similar case from the United Kingdom: at [79]. This case concerned a transgender man, who had given birth to a child and had been registered as the child’s mother, who sought to be registered as the child’s ‘father’, ‘parent’ or ‘gestational parent’: at [79]-[84]. The Court in that case held that the legislation required the male parent to be listed as the ‘mother’ because it defined ‘mother’ as a person who gives birth to a child: at [81]. The Court accepted that this requirement was a ‘significant interference with a person’s sense of their own identity’ and was not compatible with the right to respect for private life: at [82] However, the interference was held to be justified, as the legislation served to protect the rights of children to know who gave birth to them and what that person’s status was: at [82]-[83]. The Tribunal noted that the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) served a similar purpose in enabling a child to identify the person who gave birth to them, and concluded that the correct and preferable construction of the Births, Deaths and Marriages Act 2003 (Qld) was to register the applicant as the child’s mother: at [79] and [85].
• Crookes v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 149
  The appellant sought a review of the respondent’s decision not to convert her employment to permanent. There was no substantive discussion of human rights or the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in the reasons.
• Crossman v Queensland Police Service [2020] QDC 122 and 123
  These cases concerned an appeal by the self-represented Applicant against convictions for driving over the prescribed speed limit on two separate occasions. In his notice of appeal for both convictions, the Applicant argued that the Magistrates who had handed down the convictions had erred in respect of section 35 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Section 35 concerns the right to protection against retrospective criminal laws. During oral submissions in these proceedings, the Applicant abandoned this ground of appeal and the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was not further mentioned in either of the proceedings.
• CSG v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCAT 412
  The Tribunal considered itself bound by s 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as a public entity when performing its role for reviewing the decision. The Tribunal noted the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation (section 25), right to a fair hearing (section 31) and right to take part in public life (section 23). The Tribunal also noted the competing right to protection of families and children (section 26). The Tribunal did not engage in any substantive discussion of those competing human rights. The Tribunal affirmed the application on the grounds that the case was not exceptional under the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld). The Tribunal gave particular weight to the length of time that had passed without any criminal convictions, as well as evidence that the applicant’s life was now manifestly different from the life she led in the period when she was charged with numerous offences.
• CTA v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General ([2021]) QCAT 442
  This case concerned an application for review of the Respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the Applicant in circumstances where the Applicant’s case was considered an exceptional case. In affirming the Respondent’s decision, the Tribunal referred to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and considered that it must weigh the interest and well-being of children as pre-eminent. The Tribunal gave proper consideration in terms of section 58(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and noted that the Applicant’s right to a fair hearing (section 31) was relevant. Tribunal ultimately held that this was an exceptional case as it had many factors taking it out of the ordinary course of events and circumstances, and confirmed the decision of the Respondent.
• CTC v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 406
  The applicant had their positive blue card cancelled and was issued a negative blue card notice on the basis that the applicant’s circumstances amounted to an exceptional case where the issuing of a positive notice would not be in the best interests of children: at [5] - [17]. There had been an incident in the applicant’s home where a male member of their household perpetrated sexual abuse against a female child in the applicant’s kinship care; at [11]. The Tribunal noted that under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), it was required to give proper consideration to any relevant human rights in making its decision, and noted that the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation (section 25), taking part in public life (section 23) and right to protection of families and children (section 26) were relevant; at [28]. The Tribunal concluded that its decision was compatible with human rights, but did not discuss these rights in any detail. The Tribunal affirmed the respondent’s decision, finding that the applicant’s case was an exceptional case where it would not be in the best interests of children to grant a blue card.
• CTR [2022] QCAT 368
  This case involved the appointment of the Public Guardian and the Public Trustee as guardian and administrator for CTR, where there were numerous claims for guardianship and administrator by CTR’s son, CTR’s friend and a parish priest. The Tribunal was satisfied that the medical evidence indicated that CTR’s diagnosis of dementia impaired his capacity to make decisions with respect to personal and financial matters. Member Casey considered that the Tribunal was subject to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and that any limitation placed on CTR’s human rights, such as CTR’s right to privacy, freedom of movement, and property rights may be engaged and limited by decision of the Tribunal to appoint a guardian and administrator. The relevant rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were freedom of movement (section 19), property rights (section 24) and right to privacy and reputation (section 25). In consideration of the evidence provided by all parties for CTR, Member Casey acknowledged that CTR’s son and CTR’s friend would not be able to effectively consult with relevant stakeholders in order to discharge appropriate decision making. Accordingly, the Public Guardian and Public Trustee were appointed pursuant to a reviewable two-year term. In making this order, Member Casey accepted that the decision was ‘the least restrictive option given the adult’s vulnerability, and that the benefits … outweigh any limitations imposed on the adult’s human rights’: at [74].
• Dale v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations) [2022] QIRC
  Mr Allan Dale (‘the appellant’) was employed in the role of an AO6 Principal Inspector within the Labour Hire Licensing Compliance Unit, Business Services Unit and applied for an advertised position within the same Unit for an AO7 Lead Inspector. The successful applicants chosen by the respondent did not include the appellant and the appellant appealed this promotion decision. The appellant submitted that the respondent breached the appellant's human rights by failing to afford him recognition and equality before the law (s 15), failing to afford him protection from being humiliated (s 17), impacting his right to freedom of expression (s 21), denying his right to take part in public life (s 23) and attacking his reputation (s 25): at [25]. The respondent submitted that in basing his appeal on “unfairness” rather than an independent ground of “unlawfulness” as required by section 59 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), he could not be afforded the relief or remedy sought. The respondent also submitted that the rights under sections 15, 17, 21, 23 and 25 of the Act had not been engaged, essentially contending that the appellant had not been treated in the manner in which he had depicted: at [27]. The Commission determined that the relevant process of recruitment and selection at the subject of the appeal was conducted in accordance with Directive 12/20 Recruitment and Selection and the Public Service Act 2008 (Qld). As such, there was no substantive discussion of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The respondent’s decision was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed.