Items

• AA v State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations) [2021] QCAT 258
  This case concerned a privacy complaint made against the State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations). The Tribunal did not consider the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as the Tribunal was exercising its original jurisdiction. This case concerned a privacy complaint made by the applicant, AA, against the State of Queensland (Office of Industrial Relations). Both parties agreed there had been four breaches of AA’s privacy that had occurred in the course of telephone conversations between a staff member of the Office of Industrial Relations and staff of QSuper: at [4]. AA argued the breaches were malicious in nature and that a higher monetary award should be made: at [6]. The privacy complaint was referred to the Tribunal under section 176 of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld): at [2]. Based on the evidence and submissions, the Tribunal found that breaches of Information Privacy Principle 11 occurred on four occasions: at [57]. It was held there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the privacy breaches were motivated by malice: at [64]. The Tribunal held that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) had no operation in this matter: at [58]. Member Kent found that the Tribunal was sitting in its original jurisdiction and, therefore, was not a ‘public entity’ within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [58].
• AAD [2025] QCAT 400
  There was no substantial discussion of human rights in this matter.
• AAW v Department of Justice – Blue Card Services [2025] QCAT 434
  There was no substantial new findings in relation to human rights. The Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld) is to be interpreted with the proper purpose of promoting and protecting the human rights, interests, and well-being, of children and young people.
• AB v CD [2020] QCAT 295
  The applicant made an application for a minor debt for the collection and recovery of a child support overpayment by one parent to another. The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal briefly considered the right to privacy and reputation (s 25 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)) and issued a non-publication order so that the parties involved would remain anonymous. This case concerned an application for a minor debt for the collection and recovery of an assessed child support overpayment by one parent to another. Neither parent resided in Queensland, however, the applicant’s agent had its place of business of the Gold Coast. Thus, the matter was heard before the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that s 3(2) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (Cth) required the legislation to be administered in a manner that was ‘consistent’ to attain its objects, but had limited interference with the ‘privacy of persons’: at [2]. In doing so, the Tribunal highlighted s 25 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) which protects the right to privacy and reputation, and noted that although the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ‘does not have extra-territorial effect beyond the State of Queensland,’ the Tribunal would protect the privacy of the parties by referring to them anonymously and by making a non-publication order ‘with respect to their identities and addresses’: at [3]-[4]. It was ultimately held that the Tribunal did ‘not have jurisdiction to hear this matter having regard to ss 104, 113, and 113A’ of the Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (Cth) and the application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: at [75].
• AB v Chief Executive of Queensland Health [2025] QSC 277
  There was no substantial discussion of human rights in this matter.
• AB v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2022] QCAT 413
  This case concerned an application for the review of a negative blue card notice. The Tribunal recognised it was acting as a public entity and was obligated to make a decision in a way that was compatible and consistent with human rights and to limit human rights only to the extent that it was reasonable and demonstrably justified. The Tribunal considered that there was no basis to limit AB’s human rights, namely the right to privacy and reputation (section 25), right to take part in public life (section 23) and right to further vocational education and training (section 36(2)) under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), by issuing the negative blue card notice: [61]. Due to evidence that AB no longer engaged in the criminal conduct of his youth and had reformed his lifestyle, the Tribunal found that AB did not pose a risk to children and the respondent’s decision was set aside.
• Abbott v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2021] QIRC 113
  This matter is related to a public service appeal for appointment to a high classification level. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was referred to in a departmental document tendered in evidence. However, there was no substantive discussion of human rights in the reasons.
• ABC v Assistant Commissioner Maurice Carless [2023] QCAT 85
• ABD v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 57
  This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the applicant. The Tribunal stated that it had considered the provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and concluded that its decision did not unreasonably compromise any of the human rights affected. ABD (‘the applicant’) was issued a negative blue card notice on the basis that the applicant’s circumstances amounted to an ‘exceptional case’ where the issuing of a positive notice would not be in the best interests of children: at [5]. ABD had sought a positive blue card notice in order to work with vulnerable people, including young people and children: at [2] and [8]. The negative notice was issued because of ABD’s prior offending behaviour, which included three charges of assault, two domestic violence orders, and seven road traffic offences: at [12]. The Tribunal discussed the various factors it needed to consider in determining whether ABD’s application was an exceptional case, including rehabilitation, remorse, and insight: at [29]. The Tribunal considered the role that alcohol dependency had played in the applicant’s offending behaviour, noting that the applicant had since ceased consuming alcohol, reconciled with his wife, and developed support networks including his church: at [68]. The Tribunal had regard to the human rights of the applicant and potential children the applicant might come into contact with, stating that it was ‘satisfied that there [was] no unreasonable compromise of the human rights of any affected, or potentially affected, person’: at [72]. The footnotes referenced the right to protection of families and children (s 26(2)) and the section providing that human rights may be limited (s 13(2)(b)). The respondent’s decision was set aside and replaced with the Tribunal’s decision that there was no exceptional case: at [74].
• AC v Scheme Manager, Victim Assist Queensland, Department of Youth Justice and Victim Support [2026] QCAT 89
  There is no substantive discussion of human rights in this matter.
• Accoom v Pickering [2020] QSC 388
  This case concerned an application for orders regarding a family dispute over the burial location of a deceased Indigenous man. Henry J noted that s 28 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples) did not affect the Court’s usual approach to resolving these types of cases as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander customs have always been considered. This case concerned a dispute between the family members of a deceased Indigenous man regarding his burial location. After a failed mediation, the deceased’s mother (‘the applicant’) applied to the Court seeking orders which included, inter alia, that pursuant to s 6 of the Succession Act 1991 (Qld), the deceased should be buried in Mareeba, Queensland; the funeral expenses were to be paid by the applicant; and there was to be no order as to costs: at 2. While Justice Henry noted that neither s 6 nor any other section of the Succession Act 1991 (Qld) provided for decision-making as to burials, he held that s 6(1) was of particular relevance to the present case. More specifically, His Honour linked s 6(1)’s ‘conferral of power to grant letters of administration and determine all matters relating to administration’ to the common law rule that the ‘person entitled to administration is usually the person responsible for arranging the funeral and burial of the deceased’: at 3. Furthermore, r 610 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules establishes the priority of persons to whom the court may grant letters of administration. As the deceased’s mother was the applicant, it followed from the common law rule that her application was to be favoured, although it should be noted that past case law has held that this rule is not to be ‘“rigidly applied”’: at 3. Regarding human rights, Justice Henry noted that ‘it was uncontroversial in Queensland before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) that Aboriginal custom, including cultural and spiritual beliefs, are a relevant consideration in a case like the present’. As a result, His Honour held that neither the application of s 28 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (Cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples), nor s 48 (interpretation) would ‘produce a different approach than that already taken by this [Court]’: at 4. The applicant and the deceased’s aunt both presented arguments as to why the deceased should be buried in either Mareeba or Croydon, respectively, the latter being where the deceased had spent a significant part of his life. In response to the evidence related to Aboriginal culture, Justice Henry noted that ‘if the outcome of Aboriginal custom in this case were clear cut and yielded a singular result, I would readily honour it,’ however, ‘the reality [was] that there [was] a difficult mix of custom related considerations in play’: at 4. The application was ultimately granted as the deceased’s ‘cultural connections’ to Croydon were not ‘so exclusive or so compelling as to trump the mix of other considerations, including practical considerations and the common law starting point, trending to favour a burial at Mareeba’: at 8.
• ACF v Chief Executive – Department of Education [2025] QCAT 443
  The applicant (ACF) had been issued a direction prohibiting him from entering the premises of a state primary school for one year because of his behaviour. ACF relied on his right to freedom of expression under section 21 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and his right to take part in public life under section 23 in seeking a review of the decision, to which he claimed to be ‘excessive’. In particular, he argued that the one year ban did not meet the proportionality test under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [53]-[54]. The Tribunal affirmed the respondent’s decision. Though it acknowledged that the applicant was entitled to his right to freedom of expression, it held that this right did not extend to the conduct in question here. Whilst ACF was afforded the benefit of the rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), which the Tribunal was bound to consider, there was a competing right that could not be overlooked: at [59]. Section 26(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), affords every child without discrimination, the protection, that is needed by the child, and is in the child’s best interests, because of being a child. Thus, any decision for the purposes of s 341 of the Education (General Provisions) Act 2006 (Qld) ('EGP Act') which could be said to infringe ACF’s rights would be compatible with the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), for the reasons outlined under section 13 of the Act: at [59]. By application of the EGP Act in conjunction with the HR Act in making the correct and preferable decision, such rights must 'yield to the rights of a child and so be limited’: at [60]. Member Taylor ended the review by noting that no less restrictive options were appropriate in the circumstances.
• ADI v EGI [2020] QDC 13
  The provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) were cited by a self-represented applicant arguing for a stay of the decision of the Magistrates Court to dismiss her application to vary a protection order. The court gave limited consideration to the interpretation provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), and did not elaborate on the applicant’s arguments. This case concerned an application for a stay of the decision of the Magistrates Court to dismiss an application brought by the appellant to vary a protection order. The self-represented appellant raised ss 17 (protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), 26 (protection of families and children) and 31 (right to a fair hearing) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in her submissions to the court. In making his decision to refuse the application for a stay, Smith DCJA held that he needed to have regard to the relevant provisions of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [8]. His Honour stated that he had ‘regard to s 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)’ (the interpretation provision) but did not elaborate further or discuss the above submissions made by the appellant: at [43].
• ADU [2021] QCAT 70
  This matter concerned the replacement of ADU’s enduring power of attorney for personal and health matters with the appointment of the Office of the Public Guardian. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was discussed in relation to ADU’s right to freedom of expression, right to a fair hearing and the circumstances in which a human right may be limited. ADU had been in custody after serving sentences for sexual offences against children and was subject to a continuing detention order under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (‘DPSO Act’). In the course of the annual review of that order (‘DPSO Act proceedings'), the Supreme Court raised concerns about ADU’s capacity to defend the review proceeding and referred the matter to the Tribunal: at [2]. The Tribunal accordingly initiated applications for a declaration about capacity and to appoint a guardian. Further applications were made when it was realised that an enduring power of attorney had been executed appointing ADU’s father, FDA, as the attorney for financial and personal/health matters: at [4]. ADU’s schizophrenia manifested in delusional beliefs of being persecuted by courts, lawyers and mental health practitioners, particularly in relation to the convictions for sexual offences against children: at [29]. The Tribunal held that ADU was in no position to make informed and rational decisions about his review proceedings for continuing detention due to his delusions and preoccupations, and that the presumption of capacity had been rebutted: at [34]-[37]. FDA did not wish to have power of attorney in relation to personal decisions for ADU, especially those involving litigation, and did not realise he had been appointed to do this: at [41]. FDA resided in South Australia and was a retired accountant. FDA felt comfortable handling ADU’s financial matters, but felt ill-equipped to make personal decisions for ADU given his lack of understanding on the Queensland legal system, his age (76 years old), and other personal circumstances: at [41]. ADU also wished for FDA to remain as attorney only for financial matters: at [42]. The Tribunal considered it desirable for FDA to be relieved of the power of attorney, but only for decisions relating to the DPSO Act proceedings: at [46]. The Tribunal did not find it appropriate to grant leave to FDA to resign as ADU’s attorney completely for all personal/health matters: at [60]. The Office of the Public Guardian submitted that appointing a guardian would infringe on ADU’s rights without achieving the desired purpose, referring to s 13(2)(c) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [52]. The Tribunal found that it would be difficult to facilitate ADU’s right to a fair hearing under section 31(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) if his case was left entirely to him to self-represent, in light of his paranoid delusions about the litigation: at [53]. The Tribunal considered that any limitation on his rights by the appointment of a substitute decision-maker was reasonable in order to effectively advocate for ADU’s legitimate interest in being released from custody: at [54]. The Tribunal appointed a guardian, namely the Public Guardian, to overtake the enduring power of attorney for the purpose of the DPSO Act proceedings and refused leave to FDA to resign as attorney for all other personal/health matters: at [56], [59], [61].
• ADU [2025] QCAT 385
  There was no substantial discussion of human rights in this case.
• ADW [2021] QCAT 453
  This matter concerned an interim order application for the appointment of a guardian and an administrator. The Tribunal referred generally to the imperative under section 13(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) to not restrict rights and freedoms except where that is demonstrably justified. It was subsequently noted that appointing a guardian and administrator on an interim basis is a serious step and that such rights should only be infringed where there is an immediate risk of harm of sufficient magnitude. The Tribunal did not engage in any further substantive discussion of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
• Aitchison v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2023] QCAT 45
  This case involved an application by the Queensland Police Service to dismiss or strike out an application, in which the applicant requested a review of the revocation of their firearm licence. Member Munasinghe considered that dismissing the proceeding and denying the applicant the opportunity to make oral submissions would unreasonably and unjustifiably limit the applicant’s right to a fair trial under section 31 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
• Aitchison v Queensland Police Service – Weapons Licensing [2024] QCAT 9
  This matter concerned a review to a weapons licence revocation made by the Queensland Police Service over concerns to the applicant’s ongoing traffic offences. The Tribunal references the applicant’s right to not be punished more than once for his offences under section 34 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). However, in the circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that any limitation that the respondent’s actions placed on the applicant’s right was consistent with the purpose of promoting and protecting the public interest of ensuring that weapon possession and use are subordinate to public and individual safety. The Tribunal reaffirmed the respondent’s decision to revoke the applicant’s firearm licence.
• Alkhousi v The Star Entertainment Qld Ltd [2024] QCAT 433
  There is no substantial discussion of human rights in this matter. Sections 58 and 59 claims fail because the Respondents are not public entities within the meaning of section 9 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld).
• Alvarado v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 72
  There was no substantial discussion of human rights in this matter.
• Alvarado v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) and Anor [2024] QIRC 73
  There was no substantial discussion of human rights in this matter.
• Alzino v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 24
  The case concerned a Queensland Health employee seeking review for a denied vaccine exemption. It was affirmed that any limit on the human rights of the applicant was reasonably justified by the need to protect the lives and health of the community against the COVID-19 pandemic.
• AM [2021] QCAT 394
  This case concerned a review of the appointment of RM as Guardian for AM for legal matters. AM’s mother, FK, applied for a review of this appointment. The Tribunal previously appointed AM’s father as Guardian for legal matters including visa applications or immigration issues relating directly or indirectly to AM and his family in circumstances where AM was a 25 year old male with Down Syndrome. An application was subsequently made by AM’s mother, FK, who moved from Fiji to Australia under a carer visa to provide care for AM in circumstances where she was concerned about the adequacy of care being provided to him. The Tribunal conducted a review of the appointment of RM as guardian pursuant to s 31 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld). The Tribunal was satisfied that the medical evidence established that AM’s Down Syndrome and intellectual disability impaired his capacity to make decisions about simple lifestyle, accommodation and financial matters: at [13]. In the context of the dispute between AM’s parents, the Tribunal considered that the Public Guardian was more appropriate to bring an independent decision-making framework to the decisions at hand, and appointed the Public Guardian as guardian for AM on a short-term basis, to be reviewed by the Tribunal in 6 months: at [24]. Member McDonald recognised that s 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) obliged the Tribunal to interpret statutory provisions to the extent possible that is consistent with their purpose in a way compatible with human rights, and that appointing a guardian would result in some incursions on an adult’s right to privacy (s 25 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)): at [25]. Member McDonald was satisfied that the limits imposed by the order were reasonable and justified in accordance with s 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) as it sought to ensure AM’s interests were adequately protected in exercising substituted decision making around his lifestyle and accommodation decisions: at [26].
• AM v Director General Department of Justice and Attorney General [2023] QCAT 6
  The Tribunal set aside a decision of the Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General and found that the applicant’s case was not ‘exceptional’ in relation to his application for a positive notice for a blue card. This matter concerned an appeal from a decision that there was an ‘exceptional’ case within the meaning of s221(2) of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2009 (Qld). The Tribunal affirmed that it was a public entity when conducting an administrative review of a child related employment screening decision such as was the subject of the application: at [9]. It would be required to make decisions within section 8 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and must give consideration to any human rights affected by the decision pursuant to ss 11 and 58 Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [9]. The Tribunal considered that such rights may only be limited where it is reasonable and demonstrably justified in accordance with section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [42]. These rights compete with children’s rights protected by the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2009 (Qld), and the legislative framework made clear that children’s rights to protection from harm and to be safely cared for took priority. The Tribunal held that it would not be consistent with human rights to limit the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation, to take part in public life and to further vocational education and training protected by the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), where the evidence indicated that he no longer demonstrated behaviour which made him a poor role model for children. The Tribunal noted several protective factors weighing in favour of the applicant’s case not being ‘exceptional’ including insight, development of strategies and tools to manage potential triggers, a strong support system, and greater stability in the applicant’s social circumstances: at [37]-[39]. In the circumstances, the Tribunal set aside the respondent’s decision and considered that the applicant was not an exceptional case.
• Amaya v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 117
  This case concerned an appeal of a Queensland Health decision that denied the appellant an exemption from compliance with an employment vaccination directive on the basis of her religious beliefs as a Seventh Day Adventist (‘the decision’). The Commission was required to conduct a review of the decision to determine whether it was fair and reasonable. The Commission noted the reasons for the decision acknowledged the impact of the decision on the appellant’s human rights including the right to recognition and equality before the law (section 15 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)), the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief (section 20 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)), property rights (section 24 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)) and the right to protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (including not to be subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person’s full, free and informed consent) (section 17 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)). The respondent was satisfied those limits on human rights were justified by the need to ensure the readiness of the health system in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, and to protect the lives of employees, patients and the community they serve. On review of the decision, the Commission considered the decision failed to meaningfully consider the appellant’s religious beliefs and was therefore not fair and reasonable: at [34]-[37]. The Commission set aside the decision and directed a fresh internal review by a different decision maker of the respondent.