Items

• Zhao v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2022] QIRC 185
  This case concerned an appeal by the applicant against the respondent’s decision not to permanently appoint the applicant within Queensland Health. The applicant filed an appeal with the Industrial Registry. The Industrial Relations Commission noted that, in making the decision, particular attention was paid to Directive 09/20 (fixed term temporary employment). The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) is considered under 4.5 of the Directive. There was no substantial discussion of human rights.
• ZDA [2022] QCAT 167
  ZDA was a 92-year-old hospital inpatient. Her nephew and a solicitor applied for interim appointment as her guardian and administrator respectively. In dismissing their application, Member Kanowski acknowledged ZDA’s right to the freedom to choose where to live (section 19) and their property rights (in restricting their control of their property) (section 24): at [16]. In acknowledging section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), that human rights may only be limited in particular circumstances, the Tribunal acknowledged that the decision to restrict such rights should not be made on the basis of mere convenience but rather, the existence of an immediate risk of harm to ZDA’s health, welfare or property. In concluding that no such immediate risk of harm existed that would justify interim appointments, the Tribunal dismissed the applications.
• Young v Dawson (No. 2) [2022] QCAT 48
  The applicant was a police officer who was charged with four disciplinary allegations and found guilty by the respondent. The Tribunal noted that it was required under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) to have regard to the applicant’s human rights, and found that the applicant’s right to freedom of expression (section 21) and right to not have his reputation unlawfully attacked (section 25(b)) were potentially limited. The Tribunal was satisfied that limitations on these rights were consistent with the proper purpose of upholding public confidence in the police service and ensuring police discipline
• YM v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 224
  The applicant originally held a positive notice and a blue card, but it was revoked upon the Department of Justice and Attorney-General being notified by the Queensland Police Service that he had been found to be in possession of 47 capsules of MDMA: at [2] - [4]. There was no conviction recorded but it met the requirements of ‘conviction’ for the purposes of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld): at [11]. The Department then decided to treat the applicant’s circumstances as an ‘exceptional case’ in which it would not be in the best interests of children to issue a working with children clearance, despite it not being a ‘serious offence’ and thus automatically requiring the issuance of a negative notice: at [9] - [12]. The Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was discussed in weighing up the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation against a child’s right to protection under s26(2): at [108] - [109]. The application originally submitted the denial of the blue card denies him his basic human right to work which is not an express right in the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), but was discussed under privacy and reputation, which had been noted might encompass a right to work; at [108]. The Tribunal however considered the welfare and interests of children as paramount, one of which all other considerations must yield, and taking into account the importance of preserving this human right and the purpose behind limiting the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation, found it consistent with s13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) to restrict the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation: at [110] - [111]. In making its decision, the Tribunal considered evidence such as the Life Story submitted by the applicant, a psychologist’s letter, steps taken to address the applicant’s triggers and substance abuse history, witness statements and the nature of his drug charge causing the disqualification of his blue card. The Tribunal was unsatisfied with the steps the applicant has taken and his understanding of his conduct, and found there to be an exceptional case and so affirmed the decision from the Department of Justice and Attorney-General to issue the applicant with a negative notice: at [112] - [116].
• WXL [2022] QCAT 383
  The Tribunal referred to the right to freedom of movement (s 19), property rights (s 24) right to privacy and reputation (s 25), and right to liberty and security of person (s 29) under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal considered the human rights raised in the submissions and found them justifiably balanced in the circumstances but did not engage in any further substantive discussion.
• Woolston v Commissioner of Police [2022] QDC 70
  This case related to an appeal by a self-represented Appellant against two convictions for failing to provide specimens under the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld). The Appellant contended that the police obstructed themselves from taking a blood specimen from her in circumstances where she refused to supply a sample of breath, which resulted in conduct by the police that was inconsistent with her right to health services (section 37) pursuant to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Loury QC DCJ dismissed the appeal and reasoned that the right to health protects ‘a right to access health services without discrimination and a right to not be refused emergency medical treatment that is immediately necessary to save the person’s life or to prevent serious impairment to the person’: at [59]. The Appellant’s right to health had not been obstructed in the course of the police conduct, which led Loury QC DCJ to conclude there was ‘nothing in this ground of appeal’: at [60].
• Wood v The King & Anor [2022] QSC 216
  The applicant sought a declaration from the District Court as to the lawfulness of his detention for domestic violence offences for which he failed to appear in relation to a bail undertaking, leading to his arrest and remand. The District Court referred that question of law to the Supreme Court pursuant to section 49(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The relevant question raised by the applicant was whether section 29(7) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) provided a right to declaratory relief or just provides that one should exist: at [70]. The Court reasoned that section 29(7) did not vest jurisdiction in any court, but instead recognised a human right to apply to a court for a declaration as to the lawfulness of detention: at [81]. Given that ‘court’ includes inferior courts such as the District Court, the Magistrates Court, the Childrens Court and the Coroners Court which have no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief (at [82]-[83]), the Court concluded that the appropriate forum for an application under 29(7) was to apply for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court: at [90]. The human right identified in section 29(7) would be accommodated by such an application: at [90]. With reference to the applicant’s specific circumstance, the Court ultimately concluded that section 29(7) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) did not vest jurisdiction in the District Court to grant a declaration that the prisoner was being held in custody unlawfully. To make such a challenge, the applicant, or any other prisoner ought to seek habeas corpus in the Supreme Court: at [93]. In any event, the misguided applicant’s real remedy was to simply apply for bail: at [94].
• WMJ [2021] QCAT 283
  This case concerned a review of the guardianship and administration appointments for WMJ. The Tribunal applied the General Principles in section 11B(3) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld), including, in particular, the principle that the adult is entitled to the same human rights and fundamental freedoms that apply to those with capacity. In making the decision to continue the guardianship and administration appointments for WMJ, the Tribunal noted that it had considered the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal acknowledged that while the continued guardianship and administration appointments limited WMJs human rights, this was reasonably justified due to the importance of protecting WMJ from serious harm, particularly in regards to WMJ’s accommodation and unmet care needs.
• Witthahn & Ors v Wakefield (Chief Executive of Hospital & Health Services & Director General of Queensland Health) & Ors [2022] QSC 95
  This was a costs decision. The applicants challenged the directives of the Chief Executive of Queensland Health to make COVID-19 vaccination compulsory for ambulance officers and nurses in public hospitals and sought relief and remedies under ss 59(2) and 58 of the Human Rights Act 2009 (Qld). A new directive was then made in different circumstances (the emergence of Omicron) which meant that new evidence (such as that relating to vaccine efficacy) would be needed. The case was adjourned and no order as to costs thrown away by the adjournment on 14 February 2022 was made. Dalton J held that the respondent and the sixth applicant (who discontinued her proceeding) bear their own costs of the proceeding.
• Wilson v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2022] QIRC 329
  This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision directing the applicant, Ms Wilson, to attend an independent medical examination. The tribunal affirmed the respondent’s decision. There was no substantive discussion of human rights.
• William Peter Hulbert v Queensland Racing Integrity Commission [2022] QCAT 130
  The case concerned a finding by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission that the applicant had engaged in misconduct. The Tribunal determined that the limitations on the applicant’s human rights were reasonable and demonstrably justifiable. The case concerned an application for review of a finding by the Queensland Racing Integrity Commission that the applicant had engaged in misconduct regarding the upload of an audio recording of the appellant containing offensive language. The applicant submitted that his freedom of speech has been impacted and that the Rule 228(b) was incompatible with the objects of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [44].</p><p>The Tribunal set out section 21 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) and considered that ‘it has been engaged and potentially limited by the decision of the Tribunal:’ at [46]-[47]. However, the Tribunal considered that the right to freedom of expression may be subjected to ‘reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’ and that ‘decision-makers can make decisions that limit freedom of expression to the extent that is reasonably and demonstrably justifiable:’ at [48]. The Tribunal found that the limitations on Mr Hulbert’s human rights were justified as ‘the application of Rule 228(b) was a modest curtailment of his right of freedom of expression and is accordingly the least restrictive means by which to achieve the objects of the Acts;’ the curtailment of offensive language was reasonable and proportionate in a professional racing context and ‘the human right engaged has been balanced against the risk to the wider racing community if the unrestricted use of otherwise offensive language is not curtailed:’ at [49].
• Whitson v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2023] QIRC 202
  The case concerned an appeal of an internal review decision in circumstances where the appellant was absent from their workplace due to illness and/or injury for five years. In the internal review, the decision-maker addressed the appellant’s human rights and acknowledged that the requirement to keep the contents of a specific letter confidential would limit the right to freedom of expression (section 21) pursuant to the
• Whiteley v Stone & Anor [2021] QSC 31
  This case concerned an application for judicial review under Part 5 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld). The applicant was a night shift examiner on a mine site who managed a hazard caused by an incomplete blasting operation, where remaining material was hanging above a work site: at [5]. It collapsed four days later, killing one of the miners: at [6]. Following an investigation, the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy cancelled the applicant’s certificate of competency: at [9]. The Attorney-General of Queensland intervened in this case and the Court agreed that interpretation of sections 12, 14, and 48 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) did not engage section 48 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [32]. The Court did not reference any specific rights within the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). However, it was mentioned that the criminal proceedings in relation to this event should be completed prior to an appeal in the Industrial Magistrates Court as the applicant would be expected to give evidence to the Industrial Magistrates Court and this would negate the applicant’s right to silence in the criminal proceedings: at [25]. The Court dismissed the application for judicial review and held that the statutory pathway providing for appeal to the Industrial Magistrates Court for a full merits review was the most appropriate pathway for the applicant: at [2], [22], [23] and [31].
• White v Ideal Concreting and Landscapes ABN 75 165 352 250 [2022] QCAT 310
  The case concerned, inter alia, an application to amend a default decision to add another party. One relevant consideration was prejudice against the party to be added. The Tribunal noted that the right to a fair hearing is fundamental to any administration of justice according to law in the State of Queensland, including at the Tribunal: at [36]. Prior orders of the Tribunal notwithstanding, it had not been proven to the applicable standard that anything relevant has come to specific attention of the party to be added, with the Tribunal noting that ex parte applications have significantly higher duties on the applicant regarding evidence and submissions both for and against the making of the decision, and of which very little had been seen to be discharged: at [37]. Similar concerns had been expressed in comparable circumstances by the Tribunal on multiple occasions both before and after the passing of the Human Rights Act 2019: at [38]. The application was found to fundamentally flawed on multiple grounds and dismissed: at [49].
• Westpac Banking Corporation & Anor v Heslop & Anor (No 2) [2020] QSC 256
  The first plaintiff (Westpac) claimed $329,034.48 from the first defendant (Mr Heslop). Westpac asserted that Mr Heslop was the guarantor of a debt in this amount owed by Lonrae Pty Ltd (Lonrae) pursuant to a written guarantee and indemnity Mr Heslop executed on 24 June 2004. In his defence, Mr Heslop alleged that Westpac and the Receiver failed to comply with their respective obligations under various codes of professional practice, including the Modified Code of Banking Practice 2004, and as such, denied that he was liable to Westpac under the Guarantee. The Court rejected these arguments, finding that there was no evidence of any failure by Westpac or the Receiver to comply with the relevant codes. Mr Heslop also pleaded that Westpac and the Receiver ‘breached Article 12 of the Human Rights Act by engineering the default and subsequent events which led to assault and unlawful detention of [Mr Heslop] and the sequential loss to both [Mr Heslop] and [Ms Harper] by forcefully and unlawfully taking possession of [the Parc MLR business]. This breach resulted in the loss of dignity by both [Mr Heslop] and [Ms Harper]’: at [244]. The Court found that Mr Heslop’s reference to the ‘Human Rights Act’ was ‘unclear’: at [245]. His Honour noted that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) had not been enacted and so did not apply in December 2013 when the Receiver took control of the Lonrae assets: at [245]. The Court remarked that it was more likely Mr Helsop was referring to article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though this ‘[did] not clarify the statutory basis of the contention raised by Mr Heslop’: at [246]-[247]. Moreover, the Court found that there was no factual basis for these allegations: at [248]. The Court held that, in the circumstances, Mr Heslop’s defence to Westpac’s claim under the Guarantee failed.. The Court also dismissed Mr Heslop’s counterclaim against Westpac and the Receiver, and awarded standard costs for the counterclaim to Westpac: at [275].
• WDE v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2020] QCAT 301
  This case concerned an application for review of the respondent’s decision to issue a negative blue card notice to the self-represented applicant on the basis that the applicant was not an ‘exceptional case’ where the issuing of a positive notice would not harm the best interests of children. The applicant’s criminal history included a conviction for a serious offence within the meaning of Schedule 2 of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), being a conviction for entering a dwelling with intent by breaking whilst armed. Where a person is convicted of a serious offence, the respondent ‘must issue a negative notice unless the chief executive is satisfied it is an exceptional case in which it would not harm the best interests of children’ if a positive notice was issued: at [3], [10]. The Tribunal noted that it was ‘acting in an administrative capacity’ and, therefore, was a ‘public entity’, meaning that the Tribunal had to ‘interpret statutory provisions in a way that is compatible with human rights’ and ‘conduct itself in accordance’ with section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal stated that it had considered WDE’s right to a fair hearing and right not to be tried more than once under sections 31(1) and 34 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal noted that the review did not ‘constitute a retrial as the Tribunal’s role is not to determine the Applicant’s guilt’: at [78]. Further, the Tribunal stated that it also considered ‘the right of every child to “the protection that is needed by the child, and is in the child’s bests interests, because of being a child”’ pursuant to section 26(2) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [80]. The Tribunal also considered that the requirement in section 361(1) of the Working with Children (Risk Management and Screening) Act 2000 (Qld), that the hearing be held in private, is compatible with the human rights set out in section 31 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). The Tribunal was not satisfied that this was an exceptional case which would warrant the exercise of its discretion to award the applicant with a positive notice and confirmed the decision to issue a negative notice: at [82]. The primary factor in this determination was that there was ‘limited independent medical evidence which addresses risk factors, triggers, positive factors or preventative strategies implemented to reduce the applicant’s risk of further offending or the present status of the applicant’s mental health’: at [71]
• Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors [2020] QLC 33
  This case concerned a dispute between Waratah Coal Pty Ltd (‘Waratah’) and Youth Verdict Ltd and The Bimblebox Alliance Inc (‘the objectors’). Waratah applied for a mining lease and an environmental authority to develop a thermal coal mine in the Galilee Basin, which was objected to by the respondents. The grounds for objection included that granting the applications ‘would not be compatible with various human rights’ and would be ‘unlawful’ under section 58(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [2]. Waratah sought to ‘strike out’ the objections that relied upon the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) or obtain a ‘declaration that the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider those objections’: at [3]. The Court was therefore tasked with determining the scope and meaning of section 58(1) and whether it had jurisdiction to consider human rights issues. Section 58(1) provides that it is unlawful for a public entity (a) to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights; or (b) in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision. In determining the scope of section 58(1), the Court held that it was a ‘specialised judicial tribunal’ and ‘in conducting this hearing’ was ‘performing functions conferred on it’ by the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) and Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld): at [19]. The parties agreed that the Court’s function was administrative and, therefore, it was a public entity under s 9 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [19]. The Court analysed the meaning of ‘act’ and ‘making a decision’ contained in section 58(1)(a). Although Waratah agreed that ‘in conducting the hearing, the Court acts’ (our emphasis), it drew a distinction between ‘the conduct of the hearing and the making of a recommendation,’ the latter of which it argued was neither an ‘act’ nor a ‘decision’: at [26]-[27]. The objectors contended that ‘making a recommendation [was] an “act,”’ but argued that the making of a decision was a ‘more apt description of the activity’: at [27]. The Court went on to discuss whether it had jurisdiction to consider human rights issues in an objections hearing. The objectors contended that the granting of applications would be in breach of section 58(1) and therefore incompatible with human rights: at [70]. In contrast, Waratah argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider human rights at all due to a lack of a specific provision to this effect in the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) and Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld): at [71]. The Court disagreed, noting that section 108(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) states that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) applies to ‘all Acts and statutory instruments’ regardless of their commencement: at [72]. The Court confirmed that if section 58(1) was to apply, ‘it is directed to the administrative function’ the Court performs, ‘not the proposed activities of the miner’: at [73]. Waratah also submitted that the objectors were not ‘persons’ under section 59 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), but corporate entities (at [88]), however the Court declined to address this issue: [89]. The Court ultimately dismissed the application and ordered Waratah to pay the objectors’ costs of the application.
• Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors (No 6) [2022] QLC 21
  The case concerned an application by Waratah Coal Pty Ltd (Waratah) for a mining lease and environmental authority. The project would involve mining on several properties north of Alpha in Central Queensland, including Glen Innes, a protected area under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) known as the Bimblebox Nature Refuge (Bimblebox). Human rights arguments were raised by the objectors to the mine relating to climate change and impacts to Glen Innes. The ‘climate change’ argument was that adverse consequences of greenhouse gas emissions, including those from combusting the coal, would unjustifiably limit the enjoyment of several human rights: at [1293]. The Court determined there was a logical and rational connection between authorising the applications and emissions causing harm: at [1352]. Meanwhile, the ‘Glen Innes’ argument was that the rights to property and to privacy and home of particular landowners would be limited by the impacts of mining due to the environmental nuisance caused by noise and dust, predicted to exceed the draft environmental authority levels; and significant subsidence impacts across the property that could not be remediated at all, or not without causing further ecological damage: at [1294], [1659]. Purpose of the mine Economic benefits would be generated, including profits to the miner, royalties and taxes to the State, and social and economic benefits in regional employment and associated activity: at [1428]. The project would also provide electricity to Southeast Asia, in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all: at [1429]. These purposes were consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom: at [1430]. The interrelationship between human rights, the environment and sustainable development is recognised internationally; in Queensland through the objectives of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) and Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld); and at Commonwealth and State level through relevant policy articulating an ongoing role for exporting thermal coal, albeit in a declining market: at [1431]-[1433]. There is a close relationship between the limitation and its purpose, with the mine generating economic and employment benefits, and supplying electricity in Southeast Asia: at [1434]. Fossil fuels cannot be replaced entirely by other sources immediately and will continue to play a part in energy supply for some time: at [1439]. However, renewable energy storage and transmission technologies are rapidly developing, and renewable sources will increasingly replace thermal coal due to its declining costs and increasing reliability: at [1439]. Lower emission gas supplies can supplement renewables to achieve a less restrictive alternative: at [1440]. There is sufficient supply to meet demand for thermal coal in currently operating mines and approved projects: at [1440]. Providing additional supply of thermal coal that is cost competitive could have the consequence of increasing consumption or delaying the transition to lower emission electricity generation: at [1440]. The mine would presumably be an important source of Queensland government revenue, with that revenue being applied for the benefit of the Queensland people: at [1445]. However, the assessed economic benefits are uncertain in a market with declining demand for thermal coal, and do not fully consider the costs to the environment and of climate change: at [1446]. In any case, the cost of carbon is not a mere accounting exercise, but relates to real impacts on people, and their property and livelihoods: at [1447]. The negation of private financial interests needs to be balanced against the public interest, considering ecological costs, climate change contributions and human rights implications: at [1451]. Climate change ground Right to life The right to life imposes a negative obligation to refrain from conduct causing arbitrary deprivation of life: at [1454]. The relevant conduct is the decision to approve the application, and the limit is the climate change impact: at [1454]. The right cannot be interpreted restrictively; there is interconnectedness between humans and the physical environment; the right to life can be violated by a life-threatening situation, without the loss of life occurring; and environmental degradation, climate change, and unsustainable development constitute pressing and serious threats to the ability to enjoy the right to life: at [1480]: ‘Arbitrary’ means unpredictable, unjust or unreasonable due to not being proportionate to the legitimate aim sought, which requires a broad and general assessment of whether the interference extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose: at [1482]-[1483]. The interference here is the threat to life posed by the project’s contribution to climate impacts, and the purpose is the project’s economic benefit: at [1484]. Determining what is reasonably necessary involves a value judgment about relative costs and benefits: at [1485]. The mine is not the only way to generate economic benefit and meet the needs of electricity consumers: at [1485]. Approving the project is necessary for Waratah to secure its financial benefit, but individual interest must be weighed against the public interest in limiting the extent that climate change threatens the lives of people in Queensland: at [1485]. The project’s contribution to climate change impacts is not proportionate to the economic benefits and supplying coal to Southeast Asia: at [1486]. The limit is unreasonable because it extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the project’s purpose: at [1485]. The limitation to the right to life would arise from the resulting emissions: at [1488]. A clear and pressing threat to the right to life is now experienced by people in Queensland, which will only be exacerbated by increasing emissions: at [1505]. Emissions will cause increasingly adverse impacts to the environment, including increased fatalities in Queensland due to bushfires and bushfire smoke, heat waves, mosquito borne diseases, floods and cyclones: at [1488]. The level of future climate change impacts is not certain, so the precise risk to human health cannot be quantified: at [1488]. The importance of the limitation’s purpose needs to be balanced against the importance of preserving the human right, given its nature and extent: at [1507]. The assessed economic benefit, while considerable, was optimistic, and did not fully cost likely environmental damage, or climate change impacts, including public health and property costs: at [1508]. There would be regional benefits in increased employment and economic activity, and a mixed experience of social benefit, with landowners experiencing it more negatively and residents of Alpha more positively: at [1509]. The coal will contribute to meeting demand for electricity in Southeast Asia, but there is already adequate supply, and providing additional supply could lead to increased consumption or delay the energy transition in that market: at [1510]. The purpose of energy security in Southeast Asia can be pursued by less restrictive means: at [1510]. Climate change will, and already does, limit the right: at [1512]. Approving the project would contribute to foreseeable and preventable life-terminating harm: at [1512]. The importance of preserving the right to life, considering the nature and extent of the limitation, weighs more heavily than the economic benefits of the mine and furthering energy security for Southeast Asia: at [1513]. Rights of First Nations people Cultural rights are of fundamental importance to First Nations peoples, set against the background of systematic dispossession and destruction of culture: at [1537]. Their importance should also be seen in the context of native title, with cultural rights being consonant with, accompanying and enhancing the protection conferred by the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth): at [1541]. The Queensland Government has identified protecting these rights as an important step towards a reframed relationship between the government and First Nations peoples: at [1541]. First Nations peoples will be disproportionately affected by climate change impacts: at [1542]. The evidence provided on the nature and extent of the limitation was comprehensive and wide-ranging: at [1549] and [1551]. A striking and enduring theme in the evidence from the First Nations witnesses was their active commitment to and participation in caring for country which is critical, given the environmental impacts of climate change and the specific protection of the right to conserve and protect the environment and the productive capacity of land, waters, and other resources: at [1557]. Climate change impacts will have a profound impact on cultural rights and, for some peoples who will be displaced from their country, it risks the survival of culture: at [1565]. Previous observations on balancing the purpose and limitation in its consideration of the right to life apply to this right equally, but additional factors weigh the scale more firmly in favour of the importance of preserving the right: at [1567]. The Torres Strait Island peoples face an existential risk from sea level rise, and First Nations peoples in the north of Australia are already experiencing the effects of climate change impacts on their ability to enjoy, maintain, control, and develop culture: at [1568]. More severe impacts result in greater interference with cultural rights: at [1568]. Displacement has the potential to destroy culture, which is something that cannot be measured in monetary terms: at [1568]. This is at odds with the purpose of the right and counts against the project being approved: at [1568]. Right to protect children The scope of the right encompasses the project’s climate change implications due to the vulnerability of children to, and the disproportionate burden of, climate change impacts on present and future children: at [1586]. The importance of the right lies in the special vulnerabilities of children and their inability to control the decisions that affect them: at [1587]. The intergenerational nature of climate change is critical to the proportionality exercise: at [1588]. The adverse impacts of climate change will disproportionately affect present and future children at an ever-increasing level, and present and future children will be at a disproportionately greater risk of poorer health outcomes and premature mortality: at [1589]. Young children are more prone to heat stress: at [1590]. There are as-yet unquantified impacts on babies whose mothers are pregnant during hazardous fire events, and on young children, whose risk of developing asthma or having an episode is increased: at [1590]. As they grow and age, children will be affected by an increasingly hostile environment that will affect their learning, recreation, and working conditions: at [1591]. As life expectancy has improved, and older people are at greater risk during extreme heat, today’s children will be disproportionately affected as they enter their middle and late years, with the impacts of rising temperatures becoming increasingly dangerous over time: at [1592]. Moreover, there is an intergenerational imbalance in the effects of climate change itself: at [1594]. The burden of drawing down accumulated carbon dioxide from the atmosphere will fall to today’s children who will become adults in the future: at [1596]. The intersection of rights and impacts for First Nations children is an additional consideration: at [1601]. Increased temperatures already hamper the efforts of the First Nations parents to teach their children about their sea country: at [1601]. The displacement of children from their country will risk severing their relationship to country and culture: at [1601]. Previous considerations regarding the balance between the limitation and the right also apply here, but there is an additional aspect to the balancing exercise here: at [1602]. The intergenerational aspect of climate change risks makes the rights of children paramount: at [1603]. The principle of intergenerational equity places responsibility with today’s decision makers to make wise choices for future generations: at [1603]. The children of today and of the future will bear both the more extreme effects of climate change, and the burden of adaptation and mitigation: at [1603]. As their best interests are not served by project, this weighs the balance against approving the applications: at [1603]. Right to property Climate change impacts will include property destruction, or a sufficient restriction on the ability to use and enjoy property which amounts to a de facto expropriation: at [1611]. Property will be lost or damaged due to the increased severity and frequency of weather events such as bushfires and floods; displacement from properties will increasingly occur because of extreme weather events and sea level rise; and large areas of Queensland will become unliveable: at [1609]. The project would clearly contribute to the de facto deprivation of property for at least thousands of Queenslanders: at [1610]. The Torres Strait Islands are particularly vulnerable to both heatwaves and sea level rise: at [1610]. At a broad and general level of assessment, the deprivation of property would be arbitrary in the sense of not being proportionate to the legitimate aim: at [1613]. Property has a foundational role in Australian legal history: at [1618]. The Court endorsed statements that property is an ancient feature of common law and a fundamental common law right for the purpose of the application of the principle of legality: at [1618]. The importance of preserving the right has an additional dimension in this case, given the grief and loss of displaced First Nations peoples will be compounded by a cultural loss that cannot be compensated: at [1619]. The Court’s previous consideration of the balance between the limitation and the right set out under the right to life applies here as well, although there is a different aspect to balance here: at [1620]. Increasing the risk to property will have economic consequences: at [1621]. The displacement of people from their property, and the associated grief and health impacts, must also be considered: at [1622]. For First Nations people, there is the additional profound disruption of culture through disconnection from country: at [1622]. When the human cost of de facto expropriation of property is added to the equation, the scales weigh in favour of preserving the right: at [1622]. Right to privacy and home The right is engaged because of the evidence about sea level rise and plans to relocate up to 2,000 people from the Torres Strait: at [1626]. Climate change presents a real and serious risk to the homes of residents of the Torres Strait: at [1628]. Extreme heat is expected to make parts of Queensland unliveable: at [1628]. The Torres Strait Islands, due to their location, can be inferred to be among the first areas to become unliveable, with future sea level rise threatening homes on islands: at [1628]. The limit on the right would be arbitrary: at [1630]. The home is a sanctuary in the Australian way of thinking, reflected in common expectations and practices founded on an ingrained conception of the relationship between the citizen and the state that is rooted in the tradition of the common law: at [1631]. The relevant evidence under the cultural right establishes a profound interference with this right as well: at [1632]. Previous considerations regarding the balance between the limitation and the right also apply here, although the factors will weigh differently as the difference between interfering with a right to life and a right to home is material: at [1633]. Nevertheless, interference here is a serious matter: [1633]. In this case, there is the additional dimension that the loss of home for some First Nations peoples risks the loss of culture and the associated health burden that displacement would bring: at [1633]. The balance favours preserving the right: at [1633]. Right to enjoy human rights without discrimination The right requires considering whether a burden is imposed, or a benefit is denied that has the effect of reinforcing, perpetuating, or exacerbating disadvantage, which casts focus on the impact rather than intention: at [1642]. That is consistent with indirect discrimination, incorporated by the definition in the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): at [1642]. The impacts of climate change disproportionately affect present and future children, older people, people living in poverty, other disadvantaged people, and First Nations people: at [1643]. First Nations people and communities are at heightened risk of illness and death related to extreme heat due to higher likelihood of underlying chronic conditions such as high blood pressure, diabetes, and kidney disease, and at younger ages than others: at [1646]. First Nations people are also more likely to live in lower quality housing and to not have access to air-conditioning: at [1646]. Some communities due to location may be subjected to even more extreme combinations of heat and humidity relative to other parts of Queensland, including Far North Queensland and the Torres Strait: at [1646]. There is an additional intergenerational dimension to the disproportionate impact on First Nations children because changes to their environment and displacement due to climate change will impair their ability to learn, enjoy and maintain their culture: at [1648]. Previous considerations regarding the balance between the limitation and the right apply here as well: at [1649]. The burdens of increasing climate change will not be experienced equally: at [1649]. In this case, the disproportionate impact arises in multiple ways, falling more heavily on those who have vulnerabilities due to age, whether very young or old, or because of underlying health conditions: at [1650]. The intergenerational aspects are a key consideration, with future generations not having the same freedom due to restriction of their options for avoiding dangerous climate change: at [1651]. The impact on cultural rights of First Nations peoples is an additional dimension to the disproportionate impact: at [1652]. The intersection of multiple vulnerabilities of First Nations children, for example, increases the importance of protecting this right: at [1653]. Taking all those aspects together, the limit is not a reasonable limit that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom: at [1654]. Conclusion The balance weighs against approving the applications, taking into account the factors for each of the rights considered: at [1655]. Under the Court’s obligation to properly consider human rights in making its decision, approving the applications would not be appropriate because, taking the nature and extent of the limit into account, the importance of preserving the human right is more important than the project’s purpose: at [1655]. The project would impair the ability of the identified groups from retaining the benefit of the individual rights engaged by the project, and the evidence about the project’s benefits is not cogent and persuasive in justifying the limit: at [1657]. Glen Innes Right to property The previous discussion on the importance of the right is also relevant to this ground: at [1672]. The evidence about the subsidence, noise and dust impacts of mining establishes there will be a significant restriction on the property’s use or enjoyment, not just as a nature refuge but also for grazing purposes: at [1667]. The impact on property rights was argued not to be arbitrary through regulation by the environmental authority and the right to compensation: at [1668]. However, the evidence showing likely non-compliance with conditions and the uncertainty about the extent of residual serious harm on Bimblebox is relevant: at [1669]. In the unusual circumstances of this case, and on a broad and general assessment, approving the applications would amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property: at [1671]. There will also be significant impacts from the underground mining, including lowering the ground surface; significant cracking and dilation of the rock strata and surface cracking; a ridge and swale landscape that is stepped and tilted, and which will alter the surface water flows; and the direction of flows: at [1673]. Some of those impacts could not be remediated at all and, for those that could be, the remediation work would be undesirable because they would likely result in further ecological damage: at [1673]. The provisions of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), which provide for compensation to landowners, for interference by mining of their use and enjoyment of property, values rural land by its productive capacity: at [1674]. It will not compensate the owners for the loss of the nature refuge, or the painstaking work they and others have invested in maintaining its ecological values: at [1674]. Moreover, the owners are not entitled to compensation under the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) if the Refuge is degazetted, and the loss of that effort and commitment cannot be offset by an environmental offset: at [1674]. Right to privacy and home The previous discussion on the nature of the right applied: at [1682]. There was a dispute about whether the nature refuge could be a home for any person: at [1683]. Home should be considered in a common sense and pragmatic way that requires sufficient and continuous links, with it being a question of fact, not law, and not being based on notions of title, legal and equitable rights, and interest: at [1683]. The landowners in question had devoted substantial time and effort to both care for and understand the natural environment of Bimblebox. They would be devastated if its ecological condition was damaged and the value of their years of labour and the long-term research was lost, which is enough to found a link that it is a ‘home’: at [1688]-[1689]. The importance of the right to home had been previously considered, and the limitation is the same as the other ground: at [1691]. There are numerous international examples of violation of an equivalent right by severe environmental pollution or nuisance, including noise, waste treatment plants, air pollution, and odour, so physical exclusion from the home is not required: at [1692]. The interference must significantly impair a person’s ability to enjoy their home, private or family life, taking into account matters such as the intensity and duration of the impact and its physical and mental effects, and the evidence does not provide confidence that the landowners could continue to enjoy Bimblebox and fulfill their commitments under their agreements with the Commonwealth and State governments: at [1692]-[1693]. Balance Previous reasoning about the purpose of the limit in addressing the question of balance is relevant: at [1694]. In most cases, mine impacts on a person’s property and their use and enjoyment of their home can be adequately dealt with by imposing operating conditions that minimise the impacts, and in some cases that facilitate co-existing uses of the property; and/or through a monetary award to compensate the owners for the disturbance to, or the loss of, their property and home: at [1695]-[1697].When this is possible, it should be expected to favour the broader public interest in the economic and social benefits of a mine over the interference with private rights: at [1698]. Here, the mine is unlikely to be able to meet the operating conditions proposed to minimise nuisance impacts: at [1699]. For the more serious residual impacts on ecology due to subsidence damage, at least some damage will be permanent and there is no credible offset plan in place: at [1699]. The landowners’ significant commitment to environmental preservation will not be compensated under the compensation regime: at [1699]. The loss is not solely a matter of interference with private rights, as the values of the Bimblebox are a matter of public benefit as well: at [1700]. Nature refuges comprise almost one-third of Queensland’s total protected area system: at [1700]. Careful stewardship of land in private hands depends on confidence, the investment of time, effort, and funds will not be lightly disregarded: at [1700]. There is a public interest in only interfering with a nature refuge when there is a compelling reason to do so: at [1700]. The combination of those factors made the case unique: at [1701]. Adopting the previously described approach, the project would impair the ability of those identified above from retaining the benefit of the individual rights engaged by the project: at [1702]. The project’s benefits were not cogent and persuasive in justifying the limit: at [1702]. Conclusion The Court overall concluded on both grounds that the engaged rights would be limited by the Project and the evidence about its economic and other benefits is not cogent and persuasive in justifying the limit: at [1703].
• Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors (No 5) [2022] QLC 4
  This hearing concerned an application for an order adopting a protocol drafted by the active objectors for taking evidence from First Nations witnesses on country. It was proposed that the Court would take on country evidence from four of the First Nations witnesses and conduct site inspections. The Court noted that site inspections were a routine feature of mining objection hearings while taking on country evidence was not: at [5]. However, the Court recognised that taking on country evidence was familiar process for a court hearing native title and cultural heritage claims: at [5]. The active objectors submitted that under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the Court must not act incompatibly with the witnesses’ protected rights in conducting the hearing and deciding the application: at [15]. The Court confirmed that it was unlawful for the Court to conduct the hearing in a way that was not compatible with human rights, stating that incompatibility was dependent on whether a protected right was limited and whether that limitation was reasonable and demonstrably justifiable: at [17]. The Court considered that the evidence about the cultural protocols was central to the objection that the evidence related to: at [22]. The Court observed that refusing the request for on country evidence would limit the witnesses’ ability to enjoy and maintain their cultural heritage, to uphold their cultural protocols, and to determine how their traditional knowledge is imparted: at [22]. The Court confirmed that section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was a proportionality test which defined when a limitation of a protected right was lawful: at [23]. The Court held that it must balance the competing interests of society while the onus for justifying a limitation on human rights would rest with the party seeking to uphold it: at [25]. Waratah argued that the cost was disproportionate and that the on country evidence would not further assist the Court: at [26]. The Court discussed that the nature and purpose of the limitation on the cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, at section 28 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), would be to avoid the commitment of time and resources in taking the evidence on country: at [27]. The Court considered that time and expense were relevant considerations, and that a court should be prudent in making directions about the conduct of proceedings as it has a responsibility to wisely use public resources to discharge its functions fairly and efficiently without imposing an unjustified burden on litigants: at [28]. The Court acknowledged that declining the proposed orders would help to achieve that purpose: at [28]. The Court considered that, while it would be possible for the witnesses to give evidence on country using videoconferencing technology, it would limit the ability of the witnesses to fully observe the ceremonial aspect of imparting traditional knowledge: at [29]. In the application, the active objectors proposed that the witnesses would give evidence in the presence of people who have the collective authority to speak about matters of place and culture, and noted that the cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at section 28 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) framed cultural rights in collective terms: at [35]. It was noted that the High Court has long accepted the communal nature of rights: at [36]. The witnesses were to give evidence about the future impacts of climate change on their community’s ability to enjoy and maintain their cultural rights: at [33] and [37]. The Court held that it would be assisted in its evaluative function by seeing and hearing this evidence being given in that community: at [37]. Further, the Court found that there was utility in the evidence being given in the way proposed, that it would not impose an unreasonable and disproportionate burden on the parties or the Court, and that it would ensure that the best evidence would be received from the First Nations witnesses: at [41]-[43]. The Court considered that refusing the request to give evidence on country would not respect the cultural and group identity of the witnesses: at [40]. In deciding the application, the Court balanced the collective right to enjoy and maintain culture against the public and private interests in minimising the inconvenience and cost of litigation: at [44]. The Court recognised that confining the First Nations witnesses to their written statements was a limit to their individual and collective right to maintain their culture and how they passed on traditional knowledge: at [44]. The Court was not persuaded that the limit was reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in the circumstances of the case: at [44].
• Wallace v Tannock [2023] QSC 122
  The applicant was recognised to have a history of violent and sexual offending, as he was convicted of rape at the age of fourteen in 1988 and was then charged with an additional four counts of rape in 1992. He was sentenced to thirteen years of imprisonment, and subsequently in 1993, whilst incarcerated, was convicted of attempted murder and received a ten-year sentence to be served cumulatively to the thirteen-year sentence. Prior to the applicant’s release date of 20 December 2015, the Attorney-General made an application for a Supervision Order pursuant to s 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). The Attorney-General relied on, inter alia, assessments from three psychiatrists which recognised that the applicant had a moderate to high risk of future sexual reoffending, particularly whilst intoxicated or during a relapse of his schizophrenia. The applicant was released subject to the Supervision Order, and for some time enjoyed relative independence in part due to his participation in the NDIS from 2019 onwards. Such funding enabled the applicant to receive services from support workers who attended his residence to assist with cooking, cleaning, and shopping, and also enabled him to engage sex workers: at [10]. During the time in which the applicant was monitored by Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) pursuant to the Supervision Order, QCS staff became concerned about pornographic material on the applicant’s phone that suggested a dangerous preoccupation with female NDIS workers: at [12]. It was suggested that there was a ‘blurring of the lines’ between sex workers and female NDIS support workers in the applicant’s mind: [12]. On 21 March 2022, the applicant was issued with a direction which required, inter alia that he have only male NDIS workers (“the Support Workers Direction”); and that he would be required to obtain prior approval before having any persons, including family and associates, at his residence (“the Visitors Direction”). The applicant sought relief from those orders the basis that the orders involved a breach of natural justice and his human rights and were unreasonable. The Court referred to authority establishing that incompatibility with human rights should be considered in three stages: engagement, limitation and justification: [43]. The Court accepted that the applicant’s right to freedom of association pursuant to s 22 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) was engaged and limited by both the Support Workers Direction and the Visitors Direction: [45]. In the case of the Support Workers Direction, the Court held that this limitation was justified within the meaning of s 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), as it was calculated to reduce the damage to society that may arise from the applicant potentially reoffending against a female support worker: [46]. However, the Court held that, on the evidence before it, the Visitors Direction was not a justified limitation of the applicant’s human rights. The Visitors Direction applied to any visitor, including visitors against whom the risk of sexual offending was very low, such as male family members. Accordingly, there was no rational connection between the breadth of the restriction and the legitimate objective, which was the safety of the community. The Court ordered for the Visitors Direction to be set aside as it was an invalid limitation of the applicant’s right to freedom of association pursuant to s 22 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld): [48] - [56].
• Wagners Cement Pty Ltd & Anor v Boral Resources (Qld) Pty Ltd & Anor [2020] QSC 124
  This case concerned an agreement to supply cement by a supplier, the first plaintiff, to a purchaser, the first defendant, in December 2011. In 2019, the supplier attempted to invoke a contractual price adjustment mechanism which led to several disputes between both parties. The matter before the court primarily concerned the proper construction of the agreement: at [2]. The right to a fair trial, specifically that all judgments or decisions made by a court or tribunal in a proceeding must be made publicly available (s 31(3)) was examined by Bond J in light of confidential material that was presented during the trial: at [11]. In doing so, His Honour examined limiting this right given the limitation provisions available to courts in sections 8, 13, and 48(1) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). In assessing the power of courts to constrain public availability of judgments, His Honour noted that: ‘The juridical basis of the power is, after all, the inherent power of such courts to ensure that justice is done at trial and that must be regarded as carrying with it the power to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between the competing public interests in, on the one hand, the work of the courts being conducted in public and, on the other hand, the work of the courts being done with a view to achieving appropriate protection of private rights. The law has long recognised that there will be cases where justice cannot be done at all if absolutely everything must be done in public’: at [11]. Regardless, His Honour deemed it ‘unnecessary’ to examine section 31(3) in-depth as section 108(2) states that the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) does not affect proceedings commenced or concluded before its commencement. As such, because the present case commenced in 2019, it was unnecessary to assess: at [12].
• VTA [2023] QCAT 68
  The case concerned an application for interim orders for the appointment of a guardian and a guardian for restrictive practices. The adult was aged 49 years, resided in a Blue Care aged care facility and wished to move into a supported living home. A regional general manager for Blue Care had made the application due to concerns that VTA’s family members had impeded the preparation of a comprehensive positive behaviour support plan and that family involvement would also negatively impact any future transition into a supported living home. The Tribunal considered that the appointment of an interim substitute decision-maker was likely to impact the adult’s human rights under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), with the most relevant in the case being protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (section 17) and freedom of movement (section 19). The Tribunal noted that section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) provided that rights could be subject to reasonable limits where demonstrably justified. The Tribunal highlighted the importance of those rights and emphasised that the Tribunal should have regard to this when exercising the discretion to appoint a substitute decision-maker. The application for interim orders was dismissed due to the absence of immediate risk of harm to the adult. The Tribunal held that all concerns were best addressed by a full hearing.
• VSS v Director-General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2021] QCAT 96
  This matter concerned an application for a review of a decision from the respondent that the applicant’s case was an exceptional case and that, therefore, the applicant’s positive notice should be cancelled. The applicant was studying to be nurse and had recent drug charges. The Tribunal balanced the applicant’s right to a fair hearing (section 31) and right not to be tried or punished more than once (section 34) against the right of every child to the protection needed by them (section 26(2)) and found that any limitations arising from the Tribunal’s decision that the applicant’s case was not an exceptional case were justifiable in the circumstances.
• VSI v The Public Guardian & Ors [2023] QCATA 25
  This case concerned an appeal by VSI, the son of VR, of various decisions of the tribunal by different members on different dates: as at [2]. These decisions were made under relevant provisions of the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) and the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld). In particular, VSI submitted that the appointment of the Public Guardian was in breach of s 19 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) which recognises a person’s right to choose where to live: as at [105]. At the time of the original decision, the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) had not commenced operation, and as such, the learned member had not erred in failing to apply it: as at [107]. Member Guthrie recognised that the Tribunal was subject to the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). He noted, however, that under section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), that the rights can legitimately be limited in some circumstances: as at [124]. The member considered that, as the learned member considered it necessary for a Public Guardian to be appointed in VR’s case as the learned member was mindful of the importance of maintaining VR’s relationship with VSI. As such, Member Guthrie concluded that the right to choose where to live was legitimately limited in the circumstances: as at [124]. The Tribunal did not engage in any further substantive discussion with respect to human rights.
• Volkers v The Queen [2020] QDC 25
  This case concerned an application by former swimming coach Scott Volkers for a permanent stay of an indictment charging him with five counts of indecent dealing with two complainants who were at the time of alleged offences under the age of 16. The alleged offences occurred in the 1980s, and Mr. Volkers was originally charged in 2002. These proceedings and a later prosecution failed. The proceedings at hand commenced in November 2017, and in November 2018 Mr. Volkers was committed to stand trial for these offences. Mr. Volkers’ counsel submitted two grounds for granting the stay: lack of fairness and oppression amounting to an abuse of process by the prosecuting authority. These grounds both relied on the significant delay in Mr. Volkers being prosecuted. Counsel for Mr. Volkers provided written submissions to the effect that although prosecution began before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the Office of the Department of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) was involved in the continuation of proceedings against Mr. Volkers and was a public entity within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Further, it was submitted that the ODPP had acted in a manner that breached ss 29(5)(b) and 32(2)(c) (the right to a trial without unreasonable delay) and s 31 (the right to a fair trial) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). Pursuant to section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), the ODPP’s actions would only be compatible with human rights if the limitations placed on these rights were reasonable and demonstrably justifiable: at [99]-[100]. Reid DCJ held that in order to make a finding that Mr. Volkers’ right to a fair trial under section 31 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) had been breached, it would be necessary to find that the trial would be unfair at common law: at [101]. His Honour refused to grant a stay on the grounds the trial would be unfair, finding that the delay and destruction Mr. Volkers’ previous solicitors’ file which contained some key statements and evidence was not enough to render the trial unfair: at [88]-[89]. However, Reid DCJ held that the delay in prosecution of Mr. Volkers since 2002 did amount to a breach of his right to a trial without unreasonable delay under the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld). His Honour stated that he needed to consider the proportionality issues raised in section 13 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) in determining the remedy to be imposed: at [104]. Reid DCJ concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the appropriate remedy was to grant a permanent stay of proceedings ‘because to allow the prosecution to now proceed would be unduly oppressive and an abuse of process requiring the applicant to face, in effect, his third prosecution and in circumstances of widespread adverse publicity and significant adverse effects on the applicant’s ability to live and work’: at [113].